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UNITED STATES v. ROBISON AND THE ENFORCEMENT
OF PLEA BARGAINS ACROSS FEDERAL
JURISDICTIONAL LINES: TO BIND OR NOT TO BIND?

INTRODUCTION

When a criminal defendant bargains for a promise from the federal government in exchange for a guilty plea, that defendant has a
right to expect the government to follow through on the bargain.'
The Supreme Court has clearly held as much. 2 What is not so clear,
however, is which rules a court will follow in deciding just what the
government has promised.
In interpreting plea bargains, some courts take their cue from the
language of the Supreme Court's opinion in Santobello v. New
York,' and treat the plea agreement like a contract between the defendant and the prosecutor.4 Most courts, though, base their approach on a combination of modified contract law and the due process concerns enunciated by the Court in Mabry v. Johnson. A due
process-based analysis focuses on. the protection owed to defendants
in exchange for the constitutional rights they bargain away.' Where
plea bargains are concerned, however, different courts and different
circuits continue to put their own "spin" on the Court's rulings,7
with the result that defendants end up being the victims of judicial
inconsistency and uncertainty. This inconsistency is clearly demonstrated in a situation in which the defendant's offense spans two or
more federal judicial districts, and the defendant plea bargains in
one jurisdiction on the charges stemming from the offense.
1. See infra notes 23-31 and accompanying text (explaining the "fundamental fairness" attendant to the government's participation in the plea bargaining process).
2. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261-62 (1971).
3. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
4. Id. at 262; see also infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text (discussing the Santobello
decision and the contract principles used therein).
5. 467 U.S. 504, 507-09 (1984).
6. See infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text (discussing the Mabry court's explanation of
the due process and waiver implications of plea agreements).
7. See infra notes 136-50 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit's interpretation of the Court's statement, in Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), that the federal
government is a single entity).
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When a defendant bargains with the federal prosecutor in one judicial district and seeks to have his agreement enforced in another,
different courts can assign completely opposite meanings to that
bargain. As a result, the defendant may be left in a no-man's land
between the dueling presumptions of diametrically opposed courts. 8
United States v. Robison9 is such a case.
Robison was a disaster in the making. Although the defendant's
plea bargain was approved by a judge in one circuit, it was later
interpreted by judges in another circuit, where the court ignored the
agreement's language and the defendant's expectations.'0 This
troubling result might have been predicted because the court which
determined the meaning of the government's promises to the defendant used rules different from those of the court in which those
promises were made."
The background section of this Note begins with a brief overview
of plea bargains and the parties and policies they serve. Next, this
section describes the differing approaches courts take when interpreting plea agreements, specifically those agreements sought to be
made binding on other federal districts. This Note then examines
the courts' erratic application of specific contract-law doctrines of
ambiguity, reliance, and agency in interpreting these agreements,
and considers the split in the circuits regarding the language necessary to bind other jurisdictions. A discussion of the Sixth Circuit's
opinion in Robison follows.
The next section analyzes the Robison decision, first with respect
to the court's faulty application of contract-law principles. This
analysis includes a discussion of the apparent inconsistency between
inherent constitutional concerns and the strict application of contract and agency principles where plea agreement binding is at issue. This Note then analyzes the due process and waiver concerns
posed by the Robison court's approach, and suggests that the approach adopted by some other circuits addresses these concerns far
8. See infra notes 151-85 and accompanying text (contrasting the approaches of the Second
and Fourth Circuits to interpreting plea agreements where defendants had sought to make them
binding).
9. 924 F.2d 612 (6th Cir. 1991).
10. Id. at 613-14; see infra notes 202-22, 225-55 and accompanying text (pointing out the
Robison court's lack of inquiry into the defendant's reasonable expectations concerning the plea
agreement and the court's omission of any direct analysis of the language of the plea agreement).
1I. See infra notes 202-22 and accompanying text (explaining the effect of the different rules
in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, where the plea agreement was approved and then reviewed,
respectively).
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more satisfactorily. Finally, this Note concludes with a discussion of
the likely effect of Robison, pointing out the uncertain situation it
creates for defendants who enter plea agreements with the government, particularly those defendants charged with multistate
offenses.
I. BACKGROUND

A. Plea Bargains Generally
Plea bargains serve many interests and are subject to both statutory and judicial restraints. According to one definition, "Plea bargaining is the process by which the defendant in a criminal case
relinquishes his right to go to trial in exchange for a reduction in
charge and/or sentence." 12 This definition focuses on the benefit
granted to the defendant for negotiating a plea agreement. Other
scholars define plea bargaining by focusing on a bargain's benefits to
the state. According to this view:
[T]he state seeks to avoid trial in most prosecutions by inducing the defendant to plead guilty, . . . [and does so] by threatening to impose a harsher
sentence should [the defendant] be convicted at trial than it would impose if
they pleaded guilty. . . .The state's paramount motives in seeking to avoid
trial are to save money and to assure conviction.3

The United States Supreme Court's definition of plea bargaining
and its benefits combines these two views. 4 No matter how it is
defined, the practice of plea bargaining is acknowledged and provided for by federal law, 5 and the Supreme Court has held that
12.

MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING 1

(1978).

13. Thomas R. McCoy & Michael J. Mirra, Plea Bargaining as Due Process in Determining
Guilt. 32 STAN. L. REV. 887, 893 (1980).
14. See infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text (noting the Supreme Court's view of plea
bargaining and the attendant policy considerations).
15. The "Plea Agreement Procedure" contained in the federal rules provides:
(1) In General. The attorney for the government and the attorney for the defendant
or the defendant when acting pro se may engage in discussions with a view toward
reaching an agreement that, upon the entering of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
to a charged offense or to a lesser or related offense, the attorney for the government
will do any of the following:
(A) move for dismissal of other charges; or
(B) make a recommendation, or agree not to oppose the defendant's request, for a
particular sentence, with the understanding that such recommendation or request
shall not be binding on the court; or
(C) agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case.
The court shall not participate in any such discussions.
(2) Notice of Such Agreement. If a plea agreement has been reached by the parties,
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plea bargaining and plea bargains are not constitutionally prohibited. 6 There is, however, no absolute right to plea bargain,'17 and
courts are not required to accept a plea bargain negotiated between
a defendant and the state.' 8
As a general matter, the Supreme Court has said that plea bargaining, "[p]roperly administered, .

.

. is to be encouraged."'

9

The

Court has provided a number of policy justifications for encouraging
plea bargaining. The Court in Santobello justified plea bargaining
as "an essential component of the administration of justice.

' 20

Chief

Justice Warren Burger further explained this justification by stating
that "[i]f every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial,
the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by
many times the number of judges and court facilities."'"
the court shall, on the record, require the disclosure of the agreement in open court
or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, at the time the plea is offered. If the
agreement is of the type specified in subdivision (e)(l)(A) or (C), the court may
accept or reject the agreement, or may defer its decision as to the acceptance or
rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence report. If the
agreement is of the type specified in subdivision (e)(1)(B), the court shall advise the
defendant that if the court does not accept the recommendation or request the defendant nevertheless has no right to withdraw his plea.
(3) Acceptance of a Plea Agreement. If the court accepts the agreement, the court
shall inform the defendant that it will embody in the judgment and sentence the disposition provided for in the plea agreement.
(4) Rejection of a Plea Agreement. If the court rejects the plea agreement, the court
shall, on the record, inform the parties . . . that the court is not bound by the plea
agreement, afford the defendant the opportunity to then withdraw his plea, and advise
the defendant that if he persists in his guilty plea . . . the disposition of the case may
be less favorable to the defendant than that contemplated by the plea agreement.
(5) Time of Plea Agreement Procedure. Except for good cause shown, notification to
the court of the existence of a plea agreement shall be given at the arraignment or at
such other time, prior to trial, as may be fixed by the court.
FED. R. CRIM. P. I I(e).
16. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752-53 (1970) (stating that guilty pleas are not
constitutionally forbidden, and that "we cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the State to
extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the state").
17. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (stating that "[t]here is, of course, no
absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted").
18. Id. (pointing out that a judge may reject a plea "in exercise of sound judicial discretion");
see FED. R. CRIM. P. I I(e)(3) (stating "[ilf the court accepts the plea agreement") (emphasis
added).
19. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260.
20. Id.
21. Id.; see also Priscilla Budieri, Comment, Collateral Consequences of Guilty Pleas in the
Federal Criminal Justice System, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 157, 160-62 (1981). This Comment quotes United States Court Administrative Office statistics for the twelve-year period ending
June 30, 1980, which indicated that, on average, 77.1 percent of the defendants processed in
federal court were convicted. Of these convictions, an average of 84.9 percent of these defendants
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Finally, the Court has justified plea bargaining based on factors
besides necessity, stating its advantages to both a defendant and the
state.22 In addition, the Justices have held that "all of these [policy]
in securing agreement between
considerations presuppose fairness
23
an accused and a prosecutor.
The Court's fairness concerns are based on the federal rules of
procedure, which require that a defendant must enter his guilty plea
intelligently24 and voluntarily.25 These requirements are, in turn,
had pleaded guilty, leaving only an average of 15.1 percent of federal convictions resulting from
either jury or bench trials. Id. at 161 n.17. The author writes:
The great majority of criminal cases in federal courts are disposed of on pleas of
guilty. Were this not so, the administration of the federal courts would be seriously
threatened by breakdown. Neither the prosecution nor the judiciary could handle the
caseload if a substantial number of defendants were to insist on being tried.
Id. at 162 n.19 (citation omitted).
22. Justice Byron White has noted:
For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading
guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvious - his exposure is reduced, the
correctional process can begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are
eliminated. For the State there are also advantages - the more promptly imposed
punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the objectives of
punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or in which there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its
burden of proof.
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970); see also Santobello v.New York, 404 U.S. 257
(1971). In Santobello, the Court pointed out that disposing of charges through plea bargains is
highly desirable for many reasons, including that:
It leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much
of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pre-trial confinement for those who
are denied release pending trial; it protects the public from those accused persons who
are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pre-trial release; and by shortening the time between trial and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned.
Id. at 261.
23. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261.
24. The federal rules provide that:
the court must address the defendant personBefore accepting a plea of guilty .
ally in open court and inform him of, and determine that he understands, the
following:
(1)the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum
penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law,
including . . . that the court may also order the defendant to make restitution to any
victim of the offense; and . ..
(3) that he has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has already
been made, and he has the right to be tried by a jury and at that trial has the right to
the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against
him, and the right against compelled self-incrimination; and
(4) that if his plea of guilty . . . is accepted by the court there will not be a further
trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty . . .the defendant waives the right to a
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based on the fact that a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of a defendant's important Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. 6 In order for
the courts to review the circumstances of such a waiver, where a
defendant's plea was induced by promises, "the essence of those
promises must in some way be made known." 27 The Supreme Court,
consistent with the statute, requires that these disclosures and determinations be made on the record. 8 To help ensure that the defendant receives what he reasonably expected in exchange for his waiver,
the Court has held that when a guilty plea rests in a meaningful
degree on a prosecutor's promise, and the promise has induced the
defendant's plea, that promise must be fulfilled.29 Further, the
Court has stated that "when the prosecution breaches its promise
with respect to an executed plea agreement, the defendant pleads
guilty on a false premise, and hence his conviction cannot stand
"ao Even where the prosecutor induces a guilty plea by making
trial; and
(5) if the court intends to question the defendant under oath, . . . that the defendant's answers may later be used against the defendant in a prosecution for perjury or
false statement.
FED. R. CRIM, P. I I(c).
25. The federal rules also state:
The court shall not accept a plea of guilty . . . without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is voluntary and not the
result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement. The court shall
also inquire as to whether the defendant's willingness to plead guilty . . . results from
prior discussions between the attorney for the government and the defendant or the
defendant's attorney.
Id. I I(d). The Supreme Court articulated the standard by which it judges the voluntariness of
guilty pleas as follows:
[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the
actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own
counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper
harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or
perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes).
Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957)
(en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)). However, the defendant's fear that he
could face a possible death sentence if convicted did not constitute a threat during plea bargaining, and did not render the defendant's guilty plea involuntary or coerced. Id. at 745-47 (discussing United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968)).
26. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 264 (Douglas, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 261-62.
28. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (noting that the phrase "on the record"
means that the substance of a plea agreement must be determined by the judge hearing the plea,
and thus be made a part of the court's permanent record).
29. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262.
30. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509 (1984). The court in Santobello pointed out that,
when the government breaches a plea bargain, a court may choose between the remedies of grant-
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promises which are impossible to fulfill, due process nonetheless requires that the court fulfill the promise or grant the defendant relief. 31 In sum, if the government makes a promise to a defendant
which sways his decision to plead guilty, that defendant has a right
to expect that the promise be fulfilled, no matter what the promise
is.
ing specific performance of the bargain or allowing the defendant to withdraw his tainted guilty
plea and enter a new plea. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262-63; see also United States v. Crusco, 536
F.2d 21, 27 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that the defendant must be allowed to withdraw a guilty plea
that was not voluntarily entered where the defendant reasonably misunderstood the maximum
sentence he faced, and where that misunderstanding was based on an unfulfilled plea agreement
with the prosecutor); Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944, 950 (1st Cir. 1973) (remanding a
case for resentencing where the federal prosecutor's recommendation of a four- to eight-year sentence breached a plea agreement with the defendant - then incarcerated on a state conviction whereby the government promised to recommend an effectively concurrent federal sentence, and
where the minimum recommended sentence of four years was both longer than the defendant's
remaining state sentence and not within sentencing guidelines). But cf. United States v. Burns,
893 F.2d 1343, 1348-49 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (denying the defendant's request to withdraw his plea
where the plea agreement stated that it was void if the probation office or trial court calculated or
recommended a sentence of more than thirty to thirty-seven months, but where the trial judge
calculated the sentence at sixty months). In affirming the decision, the appellate court was "troubled" and "disturbed" by the ambiguity of the agreement and its result, but recommended only
that prosecutors modify the language of future agreements, commenting that such vague language
could leave a "serious question" as to whether the defendant reserved the right to withdraw his
plea in a situation like this one. Id.
31. For example, a promise that is impossible to fulfill may be one in which the necessary
performance is contrary to state statutes. See, e.g., Palermo v. Warden, 545 F.2d 286 (2d Cir.
1976) (affirming the grant of a writ of habeas corpus, and the plaintiff's unconditional release
from prison, based on the nonfulfillment of a plea agreement even though the prosecutor's unfulfilled promise of parole may have been ultra vires). In Palermo, the court found that, where
voluntariness concerns require relief when a prosecutor fails to fulfill promises within his power,
the same reasoning equally applies to prosecutors making promises outside their power, since it is
the defendant whose interests are compromised. Id. at 296.
Moreover, at least one court has held that the validity of a bargained-for guilty plea depends
upon the voluntariness and intelligence with which the defendant, and not his counsel, entered his
plea. See United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1986) (ruling that, even if derelictions
on the part of defense counsel contribute to ambiguities and imprecisions in plea agreements,
these failures may not be allowed to relieve the government of its primary responsibility for insuring precision in the agreement). Additionally, whether the breach of the agreement is occasioned
by the prosecutor's good faith or bad faith may well be irrelevant. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at
262 (vacating the defendant's guilty plea after a replacement prosecutor unintentionally violated
the plea agreement between his predecessor and the defendant, and noting that the fact that "the
breach . . . was inadvertent [did] not lessen its impact"); Correale, 479 F.2d at 947 (holding that
"[pirosecutorial misrepresentations, though made in good faith, even to obtain a just, and here a
mutually desired end, are not acceptable"); United States v. Barrett, 390 F. Supp. 1022, 1024
(D.N.C. 1975) (holding that interests in the "fair administration of the criminal process" and the
"interests of justice" are not sufficient to permit the prosecution to violate, whether intentionally
or unintentionally, promises made in the negotiation of guilty pleas); see also Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (holding that the suppression of material evidence by the state
justified a new trial regardless of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecutor).
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Interpreting Plea Agreements

In Santobello v. New York, 2 the Supreme Court set forth a standard for enforcing plea bargains in language that seemed to indicate
a link between plea agreements and contracts. 3 In Santobello, the
defendant pleaded guilty to a lesser included offense as part of a
plea agreement in which the state prosecutor promised to refrain
34
from making a recommendation as to the defendant's sentence.
However, at Santobello's sentencing, a new prosecutor recommended, and the judge imposed, the maximum penalty.3 5 The New
York state appellate court affirmed Santobello's conviction, 36 but
the United States Supreme Court vacated that ruling and remanded
the case so that the state court could determine whether the proper
remedy was to allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea or to
grant specific performance of the agreement.3 7 The Court ruled that
"when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled."3 8 The
Court's contract-style language in Santobello has led many lower
courts to apply contract-law principles in interpreting the obligations embodied in plea bargains. 3 9 On the other hand, Santobello's

requirement of a "voluntary and knowing" waiver and its emphasis
on "the interests of justice, ' ' 40 coupled with the Court's more recent
32. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
33. See infra note 38 and accompanying text (quoting the Court's language in Santobello).
34. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 258.
35. Id. at 259-60.
36. Id. at 260.
37. Id. at 263.
38. Id. at 262 (emphasis added).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Fentress, 792 F.2d 461, 464 (4th Cir. 1986) ("Fundamental
contract principles establish that the written plea bargain was 'adopted by the parties as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.' "); United States v. Krasn, 614 F.2d
1229, 1233 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Although plea bargaining is a matter of criminal jurisprudence, a
plea bargain itself is contractual in nature and 'subject to contract-law standards.' "); United
States v. McIntosh, 612 F.2d 835, 837 (4th Cir. 1979) ("[W]here the content of a plea bargain
and the authority for its offer are at issue, we think traditional precepts of contract and agency
should apply.").
40. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261-63. Some commentators have posited that Chief Justice Burger's analysis in Santobello must have been based at least partly on the Constitution, though he
mentioned no specific provision of the Constitution that was implicated. E.g., Peter Westen &
David Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remedies for Broken Plea Bargains, 66 CAL. L. REV.
471, 474-75 nn.10, 11 & 13 (1978); Daniel F. Kaplan, Comment, Where Promises End:
Prosecutorial Adherence to Sentence Recommendation Commitments in Plea Bargains, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 751, 754 n.13 (1985). Otherwise, the Court would have had no basis for jurisdiction
over the New York state court's decision. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 267 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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decision in Mabry v. Johnson,41 have prompted still more courts to
conclude that due process, and not contract-law analysis, should
govern the enforcement of plea bargains.42
In Mabry, the defendant challenged his sentence after the state
prosecutor withdrew a more favorable plea proposal before the defendant had entered his plea, but after the defendant had accepted
the prosecutor's offer.4 a Justice John Paul Stevens's opinion rejected
the Eighth Circuit's analysis, which stated that "fairness" dictated
that an offer of a plea bargain, like an offer to contract, could not be
withdrawn once accepted." The Court instead held that "[a] plea
bargain standing alone is without constitutional significance; in itself
it is a mere executory agreement which, until embodied in the judgment of a court, does not deprive an accused of liberty or any other
constitutionally protected interest. It is the ensuing guilty plea that
implicates the Constitution. 45 Further, Justice Stevens stated that
"only when it develops that the defendant was not fully appraised of
its consequences can his plea be challenged under the Due Process
Clause."'46 After Mabry, defendants who plea bargain no longer
need to rely solely on contract-law principles when seeking relief.
41. 467 U.S. 504 (1984).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Ingram, 979 F.2d 1179, 1184 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that
"[p]lea agreements . . . are 'unique contracts' and the ordinary contract principles are supplemented with a concern that the bargaining process not violate the defendant's right to fundamental fairness under the Due Process Clause") (citation omitted); Staten v. Neal, 880 F.2d 962, 965
(7th Cir. 1989) (explaining that "[allthough contract and agency principles may provide some
guidance in addressing plea bargaining issues, they are not controlling"); United States v. Harvey,
791 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir. 1986) (stating that "both constitutional and supervisory concerns
require holding the Government to a greater degree of responsibility than the defendant (or possibly would be either of the parties to commercial contracts) for imprecisions or ambiguities in plea
agreements"); United States v. Bowler, 585 F.2d 851, 854 (7th Cir. 1978) (stating that "[t]he
Government will not be allowed to avoid the obligation it thus incurred by claiming now that the
language literally promises nothing to the defendant" and that "[a] plea agreement is not an
appropriate context for the Government to resort to a rigidly literal . . . construction of language"); United States v. Lieber, 473 F. Supp. 884 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (ruling that principles of due
process and fairness require that courts should not strictly adhere to contract principles in the
context of plea agreements).
43. Mabry, 467 U.S. at 506.
44. Id. at 506-07.
45. Id. at 507-08 (footnote omitted). Of course, any defendant may plead guilty if he so
chooses. Only those guilty pleas entered as part of a bargain for a promise from the prosecutor are
at issue here.
46. Id. at 509. Justice Stevens's opinion in Mabry finally tied plea agreement analysis to a
specific constitutional provision - the Due Process Clause - and thus gave substance to the
constitutional analysis implicit in Santobello. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing the Santobello analysis as being based, at least in part, on the Constitution).
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By requiring voluntarily-entered 7 plea bargains, the Mabry court
extended the constitutional umbrella to protect defendants when the
government breaches a promise upon which a defendant based his
guilty plea. In the event of such a breach, a defendant is able to
either withdraw his plea or obtain specific performance of the promise. Thus, when a court accepts a defendant's guilty plea and that
plea is based on a bargain with the prosecutor, the Supreme Court
has held that principles of due process, not merely those of contract
law, control.
In analyzing sentencing promises in the plea context, one commentator has suggested that Mabry and Santobello, taken together,
call for an approach to the formation and enforcement of plea bargains which combines elements of both constitutional waiver and
contractual analysis.48 Under this approach, a prosecutor's breach of
a plea agreement violates due process if the defendant enters his
plea pursuant to that promise.49 However, courts are very inconsistent in applying this mixed approach to promises made by prosecutors in one jurisdiction with which defendants seek to bind another
jurisdiction. This Note next considers the breadth of this inconsistency and the approaches courts take when interpreting these plea
agreements.
1. Contract-Law Analysis of Plea Agreements
At least one court in the Seventh Circuit has taken the view that
a "plea bargain is, in law, just another contract .

... Other
"0

courts have relied on Santobello's language to suggest that they
should only apply traditional contract-law principles of objective interpretation to determine what a prosecutor has promised.51 In
47. In this Note, the word "entered" is used to describe the situation in which a defendant
submits a plea to the court and the court accepts that plea. Justice Stevens held that it is just such
an "entered" plea which implicates the Constitution. See supra note 45 and accompanying text
(quoting the Court's specific language in Mabry).
48. Kaplan, Comment, supra note 40, at 755.
49. Id.
50. Brooks v. United States, 708 F.2d 1280, 1281 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that the government's opposition to the defendant's motion for a reduced sentence did not breach a plea agreement where the government promised not to make any recommendations at the defendant's sentencing hearing). Applying contract law principles, Judge Richard Posner found that the contract
was not ambiguous and that the agreement contained no additional, implied term requiring the
government to stand mute in response to the defendant's motion. Id. at 1281-82. Note that Brooks
was decided before Mabry firmly established the due process line of analysis. See supra notes 4346 and accompanying text (discussing the decision in Mabry).
51. See United States v. Fentress, 792 F.2d 461 (4th Cir. 1986) (affirming a judgment of resti-
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United States v. Krasn,5 2 the Ninth Circuit stated this view clearly,
ruling that "[a]lthough plea bargaining is a matter of criminal juris-

prudence, a plea bargain itself is contractual in nature and subject
to 'contract-law standards'. Any dispute over the terms of the agree-

ment is to be resolved by objective standards.

53

Yet, as a threshold

matter, contract law authorities cannot agree on a set standard for
objective analysis. 5 Other courts have adopted individual doctrines
or maxims from contract law, such as those dealing with ambiguous

language, parol evidence, or promissory estoppel, and applied them
to plea agreements.5 5
a.

"Objective" Contract Interpretation

Objectivist theory, of which Judge Learned Hand was a proponent, posits that the subjective intent of the parties to a contract is
irrelevant. 6 In seeking to interpret 57 a contract, Judge Hand's view
tution and a consecutive sentence where the court used "fundamental contract and agency principles" and "objective standards" to find the absence of implied agreements beyond the government's written promise to recommend no more than a five-year prison sentence); United States v.
Krasn, 614 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that the content of three letters between the Assistant U.S. Attorney and defense counsel showed, by objective contract standards, that the government had agreed to dismiss the defendant's remaining counts and forego prosecution of the defendant's bribes or gratuities and criminal violations of Internal Revenue laws in exchange for the
defendant's guilty plea, but that the government did not promise the defendant immunity from
prosecution for all prior criminal acts).
52. 614 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1980).
53. Id. at 1233. The court in Krasn additionally ruled that what the parties agreed to is a
question of fact to be resolved by the district court, and subject to the "clearly erroneous" standard on review. Id.; see also United States v. Ingram, 979 F.2d 1179, 1184 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Plea
agreements are contracts, and their content and meaning are determined according to ordinary
contract principles.").
54. Some authorities would allow only a prospective evaluation of the parties' objectively apparent intent, while others define objectivity in terms of a retrospective search of the circumstances
for evidence of some shared meaning between the parties. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text (noting this distinction).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Vergara, 791 F. Supp. 1095 (N.D.W.Va. 1992) (holding that
ambiguous language in a plea agreement is to be construed against the government because the
government drafted the document); United States v. Fentress, 792 F.2d 461, 464 (4th Cir. 1986)
(applying the parol evidence rule, the court held "that the written plea bargain was adopted by
the parties as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement," and as such
could not be supplemented with the unmentioned terms suggested by the defendant); United
States v. Barrett, 390 F. Supp. 1022 (D.S.C. 1975) (finding that the defendant failed to meet his
burden with respect to estoppel where he could not prove: (1) that the government made him a
promise in exchange for his cooperation; (2) that defendant relied on this promise in pleading; and
(3) that the promise had been disregarded).
56. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH. CONTRACTS 485 (1982).
57. Id. Courts rarely distinguish between interpreting a contract and construing a contract,
although these terms are not the same. Id at 477-78. According to Farnsworth, interpretation
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was that intent indicates only the parties' state of mind when the
contract was made, not the legal extent of their obligations based on
the reasonable meaning of the words used. 58 Most authorities, however, reject the strict objectivist view and instead support a theory of
interpretation which seeks to divine the intent of the parties in terms
of a common meaning shared by those parties and ascribe that intent to the words of the contract. 59 Courts often base their "objective" analysis on the reasonable meaning of the words of the plea
agreement, viewed prospectively from the time the agreement was
made. 60 In the plea bargain context, the Sixth Circuit has held that
the language of a plea agreement will be interpreted "as a reasonable person would interpret the written word," without regard for
what a party's subjective expectations were. 61 Some courts, however,
employ a retrospective mode of interpretation, in which the court
seeks, under the label of objective analysis, to determine instead the
attempts to set the meaning parties give to the words of a contract, while construction sets the
legal effect of those words. Id. While Farnsworth notes that both Arthur Corbin and Samuel
Williston adhered to this distinction and defined construction similarly, he also points out that
courts "more often ignore [the distinction] by characterizing the process of construction as that of
'interpretation' in order to obscure the extent of their control over private agreement." Id.
58. "Reasonable meaning" refers to what a reasonable person in the position of the parties
would have thought the words meant. Id. at 485.
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 (1979) (providing that "[w]here the
parties have attached the same meaning to a promise or agreement or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning"). See generally JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO. THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 3-10 (2d ed. 1977) (comparing and contrasting Williston's
and Corbin's rules of interpretation and the stance adopted by the Restatement of Contracts).
60. 4 SAMUEL WILLISTON. A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 607 (3d ed. 1961).
Professor Williston further stated that, in interpreting a written contract, courts "will look forward from the date when the parties entered the bargain, not backward from some vantage point
of a future day." Id.; see also 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 560 (1960) (explaining that the crucial factors in interpreting the meaning of a contract are the time, place, and
circumstances at which the particular person involved entered into the contract).
61. United States v. Ykema, 887 F.2d 697, 699 (6th Cir. 1989); see United States v. Crusco,
536 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that there was sufficient objective proof that the defendant
misunderstood the sentence he was facing). The Crusco court stated that "[w]here the record
shows that 'circumstances as they existed at the time of the guilty plea, judged by objective standards, reasonably justified his mistaken impression,' a defendant must be held to have entered his
plea . . . involuntarily." Id. at 24 (quoting Mosher v. Lavallee, 491 F.2d 1346, 1348 (2d Cir.
1974)); see also United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 1986) (relying on Fourth
Circuit precedent to ignore a technically inaccurate identification of an agent and stating that
"[w]e need not believe that Harvey and his counsel actually read this disputed plea agreement
with this settled circuit law in mind" and that "lilt suffices that they were entitled to so read it
and may reasonably have done so"); United States v. Voccola, 600 F. Supp. 1534, 1537 (D.R.!.
1985) (holding that, although due process concerns played some part, "[t]he court's inquiry [was]
one of objective fact, not of subjective intent: whether the plea agreement [had] been violated vel
non").
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parties' subjective intent by looking, from a future vantage point, at
the parties' actions which occurred after the parties made their

agreement. 2 This retrospective analysis is not, however, normally
considered an objective one. 63
To a large extent, examining the literal words of an agreement to
find the intent of the parties to a plea bargain involves reading these
agreements as though both parties intended that each and every
word be given effect. For example, in In re Doe, 4 an agent for the
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") had promised the defendant that he would not be questioned in exchange for surrendering
contraband. The court refused to allow a U.S. Attorney to substitute
a promise of immunity from prosecution in place of the original
promise not to question Doe.65 Though the effect on the defendant
may only have been to give the government a chance to subpoena
him, the court did not allow the government to change the words of
the agreement. 6 In United States v. Fentress,6 7 the court applied
62. See United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that a plea agreement
to abstain from further prosecution made in one federal judicial district did not bind a prosecutor
in a different district, where the defendant's actions subsequent to entering his plea seemed to
indicate to the court that the defendant did not expect the agreement to be binding). The Robison
court also decided to look at what was not mentioned in the plea agreement as evidence of what
the parties did not intend. See id. at 614 (noting that because the plea agreement did not mention
Robison's indictment in Michigan, nor that the investigations were independent, the North Carolina prosecutor did not intend to bind his Michigan counterpart); see also United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 302 (4th Cir. 1986) (considering the defendant's testimony to the court at his
post-plea agreement sentencing hearing in determining his intent in entering into the plea agreement); infra notes 202-22 and accompanying text (discussing the Robison decision).
63. See 4 WILLISTON. supra note 60, § 607 ("If reasonableness were to be gauged by hindsight, [retrospectively redrafting a contract] would have some weight. Unfortunately . . .the wisdom of hindsight is not the test ....").
64. 410 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
65. Id. at 1165.
66. Id. at 1166; see United States v. Salazar, 909 F.2d 1447 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding that the
government's recommendation of a heavy sentence did not breach their agreement to refrain from
bringing further charges against the defendant); United States v. Fox, 889 F.2d 357 (1st Cir.
1989) (holding that the prosecutor did not breach a promise to drop four of five counts against the
defendant and to refrain from making a sentence recommendation in exchange for a plea where
the prosecutor merely informed the court about the other four offenses at the defendant's sentencing hearing); see also THOMAS W. HUTCHISON & DAVID YELLEN, FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW
AND PRACTICE 370-71 (Supp. 1991) (surveying the circuits' interpretation of sentencing plea bargains and noting that the Sixth, as well as the First and District of Columbia Circuits, have
interpreted plea agreement language quite narrowly).
In a twist on this practice of literal interpretation, however, some courts have implied that
fairness concerns may prohibit the government from making "end-runs" around its plea agreements by using hyper-literal readings of those promises. E.g., United States v. Voccola, 600 F.
Supp. 1534 (D.R.I. 1985). But as a practical matter, few interpretations are literal enough to be
considered end-runs. See United States v. Mata-Grullon, 887 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding no
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that of pa-

in holding that "[a]s a fully integrated agreement,

the described exchange may not be supplemented with unmentioned
terms."6 9 In sum, objective contract interpretation generally comprises a prospective analysis of the reasonable meaning the parties
gave to the literal words of their agreement.

b.

Contract Doctrines Applied to Plea Bargains

When courts undertake a contract-law analysis of a plea bargain,
they often apply doctrines or rules developed through the common
law of contracts. These rules of interpretation include the doctrines

of ambiguity and promissory estoppel.
i.

Ambiguity
In a further extension of contract principles to the context of plea

bargains, courts often use a variation on the maxim that ambiguities
in contract language are construed against their drafter,7 0 and thus
construe ambiguities in plea agreements against the government. As

one court noted, "in the absence of an agreement 'clearly understood by all of the parties, carefully memorialized, and fully disclosed to the Court,' the government must bear the disadvantage of
ambiguity or omission. 7 1 Courts routinely apply this doctrine in the
"end-run" where the government promised to recommend the lowest sentence within the "appropriate" sentencing range, but where the government's comments on the seriousness of the offense
caused the court to raise its finding as to what range was "appropriate"); Voccola. 600 F. Supp. at
1538 (finding no "end-run" where the government promised not to recommend any jail sentence,
but told the court how the defendant's conduct had been harmful to consumers while the court
was in the process of determining the defendant's fine). But see United States v. Bowler, 585 F.2d
851, 853-54 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that the government breached a plea agreement by not
considering mitigating factors in its sentence recommendation, where the agreement mentioned
those factors but did not specifically require their use).
67. 792 F.2d 461 (4th Cir. 1986).
68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1979) (setting forth the parol evidence
rule).
69. Fentress, 792 F.2d at 464 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 210 (1979));
see United States v. Ingram, 979 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that extrinsic evidence is
inadmissible to prove the meaning of a contract unambiguous on its face, and disallowing the
appellant's attempt to introduce parol evidence regarding a facially unambiguous plea agreement);
Baker v. United States, 781 F.2d 85, 90 (6th Cir. 1986) ("To allow defendant to attempt to prove
by affidavit that the agreement is otherwise than it appears, unambiguously, on a thorough record
would violate established contract-law standards.").
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1979).
71. United States v. Vergara, 791 F. Supp. 1095, 1099-1100 (N.D. W.Va. 1992) (quoting
United States v. Gianakakis, 671 F. Supp. 64, 72 (D. Me. 1987)); see also United States v.
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commercial setting to deter ambiguous contract language. 72 However, courts are inconsistent in their application of the ambiguity
doctrine to plea bargains, as the case of United States v. Burns73
illustrates. In Burns, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit went so far as to suggest that "it would be appropriate for prosecutors to modify the plea bargain agreement language
[at bar] to make clear" what the bargain contemplated because the
court was "disturbed by the ambiguity in the language of [this] plea
agreement . . . . 7"Nevertheless, the court did not find the defendant's guilty plea invalid under the circumstances. 75 In other words,
courts interpreting plea agreements do not always construe ambiguous language in such agreements against the government, the
drafter of the language.
Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding the government to a greater degree of responsibility than the defendant - or parties to commercial contracts - for ambiguities in plea
agreements).
72. See, e.g., Phillips v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 302, 307 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating
that under either state or federal common law contract interpretation, ambiguous terms in an
insurance contract will be strictly construed in favor of the insured); Glocker v. W. R. Grace &
Co., 974 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1992) (construing ambiguities in an insurance contract against the
insurance company that drafted the language in the contract); Milk 'N' More, Inc. v. Beavert,
963 F.2d 1342 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that the court should construe any ambiguity in the
contract against the drafter); Delk v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 959 F.2d 104 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding
that construing ambiguities against the drafter is part of federal common law contract interpretation); McLain v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 820 F. Supp. 169 (D.N.J. 1993) (noting that ambiguities are construed against the drafter as a matter of course). But see COB Shipping Canada,
Inc. v. Trans Mktg. Houston, Inc., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10795, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4,
1993) (noting that, in some instances, ambiguities should not be construed against the drafter
because "[c]ontracts are not to be interpreted by giving a strict and rigid meaning to general
words or expressions without regard to the surrounding circumstances" and because "[p]articular
words should be considered, not as if isolated from context, but in the light of the obligation as a
whole and the intention of the parties manifested thereby") (quoting William C. Atwater & Co.
v. Panama R.R. Co., 159 N.E. 418, 419 (N.Y. 1927)).
73. 893 F.2d 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
74. Id. at 1349.
75. Id. In Burns, the U.S. Attorney had promised that the defendant could nullify his plea
agreement and withdraw his guilty plea unless the government reached a sentencing calculation of
thirty to thirty-seven months. Id. at 1345. Though the prosecutor did calculate the sentence as
agreed, the sentencing judge departed from this calculation to impose a sixty-month sentence on
the defendant. Id. at 1344-45 (emphasis added). The appellate court found that the sentencing
judge had good reasons for departing from the prosecutor's sentencing recommendation, and that
federal sentencing guidelines permitted such departures. Id. at 1345, 1347. Moreover, the court
also found that the plea agreement failed to specify any remedy for the defendant if the judge,
rather than the prosecutor's office, departed from the agreed calculation, and thus found no
breach of the plea agreement. Id. at 1348-49 (emphasis added).
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Promissory estoppel

Another traditional contract-law principle which courts sometimes find relevant in the plea bargain context is promissory estoppel, or "reliance." In its most basic form, the "equity doctrine of
estoppel prevents disavowal of a contract after one party in good
faith relies to his own detriment on the representations of the
other." 6 In Palermo v. Warden," the prosecutor promised to free
the defendant on parole - the defendant having been jailed for an
unrelated crime - if the defendant returned jewels stolen in the
instant offense.7" Once the defendant returned the jewels, however,
the prosecutor refused to make good on his promise, arguing that
the return of stolen property was unlawful consideration for the bargain. 79 In granting the defendant specific performance on the plea
agreement, the court held that the government was estopped from
denying the sufficiency of the defendant's consideration since he had
already incriminated himself by returning the jewels in reliance on
the bargain.8 0
In order to bind a U.S. Attorney to a promise allegedly made by
an agent of the government in another department, the district court
in United States v. Barrett8 ruled that the defendant must show
reliance by proving: (1) that the promise was in fact made; (2) that
the defendant relied on that promise; and (3) that the government
failed to keep the promise.82 Despite Barrett's inability to prove reliance, the test which the court imposed was still less stringent than
that required in Palermo."'
The Supreme Court made clear in Santobello that a defendant
76. Palermo v. Warden, 545 F.2d 286, 295 n.12 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing I WILLISTON, supra
note 60, §§ 139-40 (3d ed. Supp. 1975).
77. 545 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1976).
78. Id. at 290-91.
79. Id. at 295.
80. Id. at 294-97.
81. 390 F. Supp. 1022 (D.S.C. 1975).
82. Id. at 1025. The court found that the defendant had failed to meet this burden of proof. Id.
at 1026.
83. 545 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1976). Compare supra note 76 and accompanying text with supra
note 82 and accompanying text (illustrating that the Barrett court did not require the detrimental
reliance which characterized the traditional 'contract law doctrine.) The Palermo court had never
reached these concerns, however, and even had the defendant not relied to his detriment, the court
had other grounds for affirming the lower court's grant of specific performance. See supra note 80
and accompanying text (noting the reason for the court's grant of specific performance); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS §§

reliance and estoppel, respectively).

90, 139 (1979) (setting forth the requirements for
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need not have been prejudiced by the government's nonperformance
to be entitled to relief for breach of a plea agreement.8 4 The Court
in Santobello noted that the sentencing judge stated in the record
that he was not at all influenced by the second prosecutor's proscribed sentence recommendation, yet the existence of the prosecutor's breach was sufficient to warrant a vacation of the defendant's
plea. 5 The Court concluded that the interests of justice, and appropriate recognition of the prosecution's duties in relation to promises
made in negotiating guilty pleas, are best served by providing the
defendant relief.8 6 To the extent that Palermo'sdetrimental reliance
test is at odds with Santobello, it highlights an inherent pitfall in
applying the rigid contract-law principle of estoppel in the plea bargain setting. Under Santobello, however, a defendant claiming reliance on a plea bargain need only show that the government
breached the agreement in order to estop the government from
avoiding it altogether. Palermo notwithstanding, the defendant need
not show that he was harmed by the breach to prove reliance.
2. Agency Analysis of Plea Agreements
Another concept derived from the arena of contract interpretation, and one that courts employ inconsistently in the plea bargain
context, is agency. 7 In the setting of commercial contracts, or even
commercial government contracts, the concept of agency can often
be very different from agency as courts apply it to plea bargains. In
Dresser v. United States,88 the defendant corporation had undertaken an internal investigation of "questionable foreign payments"
at the insistence of the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC"). 9 In exchange, the director of the SEC's Corporate Fi84. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).
85. Id. at 259.
86. Id. at 262; see In re Doe, 410 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (holding that the defendant
did not have to suffer any harm resulting from a post-agreement change in the government's
promise for the court to require that the government's promise be fulfilled); see also United States
v. Voccola, 600 F. Supp. 1534 (D.R.I. 1985) (confirming that the defendants might have been
eligible for specific performance if the government had breached its promise, even though the
defendants had eschewed an opportunity to withdraw their guilty pleas).
87. Though usually treated as an area of the law separate from the traditional study of contracts, for purposes of interpreting plea bargains in their often quasi-constitutional context, issues
of who promised what and under what if any authority, when coupled with concerns about voluntariness or reliance, do take on contractual significance.
88. 596 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1979).
89. Id. at 1233.
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nance Division promised that the information Dresser turned up
would be kept confidential and that the SEC would not conduct its
own investigation." Nonetheless, the SEC turned over the information and documents it had received from Dresser to the Justice Department upon subpoena, and even assisted in the investigation ordered by that department. 91 Stating the general rule that the
"federal government will not be bound by a contract or agreement
entered into by one of its agents unless such agent is acting within
the limits of his actual authority,"92 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Dresser that the SEC could not bind the Justice Department to a promise not to investigate the defendant corporation.98 A federal court came to a similar conclusion in the plea
bargain context in United States v. McIntosh.94 There, Circuit
Judge Kenneth Hall explained that a state prosecutor could not bind
a U.S. Attorney with a promise of immunity from prosecution because the state's attorney was not an agent of the federal government and thus had no actual authority to do so. 91
Some courts rely on the principle of "inherent agency" when considering plea agreements which purport to bind the government, but
which lack the "actual authority" to do so. In the interests of fair
dealing with the government, courts have treated some situations
where defendants plea bargain with persons having all the "indicia
of authority" to enter into the agreement as a form of reliance.9"
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1234.
92. Dresser v. United States, 596 F.2d 1231, 1236 (5th Cir. 1979) (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 1237 (concluding that the SEC's agents lacked the actual authority to contractually
limit the prosecutorial function of the Justice Department, and that any such agreement with
Dresser would have been unenforceable). The situation in Dresser was very different from a plea
agreement in two respects: the government had filed no charges, and Dresser asserted the existence of the promise as part of a preemptive suit by the corporation to forestall disclosure of
sensitive documents. Id. at 1233.
94. 612 F.2d 835 (4th Cir. 1979). The court stated that:
With predictability and reliance as the foundation of plea bargaining itself, we must
apply fundamental contract and agency principles to plea bargains as the best means
to fair enforcement of the parties' agreed obligations. . . . [H]ere, where the content
of a plea bargain and the authority for its offer are at issue, we think traditional
precepts of contract and agency should apply.
Id. at 837.
95. Id. at 836. But see supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (discussing the due process
concerns which favor the granting of relief for breach of even unfulfillable promises when plea
agreements are involved).
96. United States v. Lieber, 473 F. Supp. 844, 892 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (pointing out that, in the
agency setting, the government's standard of fairness or fair dealing should be no lower than that
required in the commercial world, where a party would likely be justified in relying on the repre-
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But in deference to perceived due process concerns, the Fourth Circuit has said that "[t]he solution does not lie in formalisms about
the express, implied or apparent authority of one United States Attorney to bind another United States Attorney . . ,,"9
Thus,
courts may not require that a government representative meet every
formal requirement of agency before they bind the government to
his plea agreement. In sum, although the decision in Santobello has
led the courts to apply a traditional style of contract interpretation
to plea agreements, subsequent case law has softened the impact of
various contract-law doctrines in this context.
3.

Due Process Analysis of Plea Agreements

The Supreme Court's decision in Mabry v. Johnson98 stands for
the proposition that courts may not analyze plea agreements strictly
by contract principles, because once the defendant has fully performed, his bargain receives constitutional protection under the Due
Process Clause.99 In addition, courts have freed the government of
its obligations under a plea agreement where the defendant
breached by failing to perform his part of the bargain.100 In some
cases, where a plea agreement also comprises an ongoing element such as cooperating with the government or testifying - of an investigation, the defendant's constitutional protection is not complete
until his performance is complete.10 ' Granting specific performance
of an illegal or unfulfillable government promise may only be justified under due process analysis.'0 2 Under a commercial contract
sentations of a person having all the indicia of authority as an inherent agent).
97. United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 428 (4th Cir. 1972).
98. 467 U.S. 504 (1984); see supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text (discussing the Mabry
decision).
99. Mabry, 467 U.S. at 507-08; see Kaplan, Comment, supra note 40, at 752 (addressing the
role of plea bargain promises with respect to sentencing and subsequent sentence-reduction hearings, and stating that "a more appropriate mode of interpreting the scope of disputed plea bargains only begins, but does not end, with the application of contract-law principles; recent Supreme Court decisions, invoking due process concerns . . . require that ordinary contract analysis
not be the exclusive touchstone for interpreting such agreements").
100. United States v. Partida-Parra, 859 F.2d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 1988).
101. See United States v. Boulier, 359 F. Supp. 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (rejecting the argument
that the government breached a plea agreement where a federal prosecutor in Florida promised
that the defendant's New York indictment would be dismissed if he pleaded guilty in Florida and
cooperated with the government, and upholding the defendant's subsequent trial in New York
after the defendant refused to provide the government any useful information), affd sub nom.
United States v. Nathan, 476 F.2d 456 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nor. Brown v. United States,
414 U.S. 823 (1973).
102. See Palermo v. Warden, 545 F.2d 286, 296 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that where a defend-
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analysis, on the other hand, an unfulfillable or illegal promise by one
party may render the bargain unenforceable based either on a failure of consideration or on public policy.103 Some commentators have
suggested the existence of a "constitutional law of contracts," and
have pointed out two types of illegal promises that are directly relevant to plea bargaining.104 The first is a promise which a prosecutor
has no authority to make; 0 the second is a promise that no government official has the authority to deliver. 0 6 Both of these types of
otherwise illegal promises may, nonetheless, be enforced in the plea
bargaining context after Mabry.107
Under due process analysis, courts have held that government
bargains inducing pleas which bring the government very little benefit must nonetheless be fulfilled.108 In the same vein, bargains inducing pleas based on governmental mistakes must likewise be enforced.100 As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated, "[I]t is a lesser
evil 'that some criminals should escape than that the government
should play an ignoble part.' "110
Again, the reason due process is implicated in a plea bargain situant pleads guilty because he relied on the prosecutor's promise, even though it is impossible to
fulfill, the defendant has a right to have that promise fulfilled).
103. See generally FARNSWORTH. supra note 56, at 43-46, 325-30 (discussing consideration as
a bargained-for exchange and public policy).
104. See Westen & Westin, supra note 40, at 528-38 (discussing the usefulness of contract law
in making constitutional judgments in deciding whether a defendant is entitled to relief for a
broken plea agreement).
105. See infra notes 115-27 and accompanying text (discussing Staten v. Neal, 880 F.2d 962
(7th Cir. 1989)).
106. Westen & Westin, supra note 40, at 531-35; see, e.g., Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d
944, 948 (1st Cir. 1973) (finding that, in exchange for the defendant's guilty plea, the prosecutor
promised that he would recommend a four- to eight-year sentence, but that the promised sentence
range was outside of the federal sentencing guidelines); United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426,
427 (4th Cir. 1972) (noting that the prosecutor in one federal district promised that, in exchange
for the defendant's guilty plea, charges against him would be dropped in another federal district).
107. See infra notes 108-13 and accompanying text (discussing how application of a due process analysis may result in enforcement of what may be illegal promises).
108. See e.g., United States v. Lieber, 473 F. Supp. 884, 893-94 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (stating that
the fact that the government struck a bad bargain should not weigh against the defendants, where
the prosecutor had promised to dismiss indictments on felony Internal Revenue Code violations in
exchange for the defendants' agreement to plead guilty to misdemeanor tax charges).
109. United States v. Partida-Parra, 859 F.2d 629, 632-33 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the
government could not rescind a plea agreement on the grounds that the prosecutor had mistakenly
charged the defendant with a misdemeanor, rather than a felony, after the defendant had entered
his plea); Correale, 479 F.2d at 947 (holding that the government was bound to perform its bargain where the prosecutor inadvertently promised the defendant a sentence outside of the federal
sentencing statute in exchange for the defendant's guilty plea).
110. United States v. Salazar, 909 F.2d 1447, 1448 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928)).
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ation is that the criminal defendant, in exchange for whatever promise the government has made, has agreed to give up certain constitutional safeguards which help assure him fair treatment at the hands
of the government.111 Simply stated, the guilty plea is the antithesis
of the right against self-incrimination. 11 2 Once a defendant has
waived this and other rights based on government promises, the Supreme Court has said that those promises must be fulfilled in the
interests of fundamental fairness as long as the defendant was informed of the content of the promises and his waiver was truly voluntary.113 Thus, whether or not a prosecutor's promise is enforceable under traditional contract or agency law in a non-plea context
may be immaterial where a plea bargain is, in fact, at issue and due
process concerns hold sway.
C. Plea Agreements Which Seek to Bind Other Jurisdictions
Issues of both due process and contractual analysis are called into
play when a defendant seeks to make plea agreements negotiated by
prosecutors in one federal district binding on federal prosecutors in
other districts. In deciding the scope and content of the agreements
in such cases, courts frequently - although inconsistently - apply
principles of agency and various other methods of interpretation. In
attempting to see how courts respond to these cases, it is useful to
explore the ways in which courts apply agency and contract principles to three plea bargaining situations. This agency section considers how courts apply these principles: first, to agreements by state
prosecutors which defendants seek to make binding on other states
or on U.S. Attorneys; second, to agreements by other federal departments sought to be made binding on U.S. Attorneys; and third, to
agreements sought to be made binding on U.S. Attorneys in different districts. It then explores the inconsistencies and divisions
among the circuits in interpreting the language of plea bargains
which do and do not bind the federal government.
I 1.See supra notes 32-49 and accompanying text (discussing the Santobello and Mabry decisions and at what point due process is implicated).
112. The right against self-incrimination is embodied in the Fifth Amendment, which provides:
"No person . . .shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ....
U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
113. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508-11 (1984).
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1. Agency and the Authority to Bind
Though the area of binding plea agreements is dominated by due
process fairness concerns, many courts nonetheless look to agency
law for help in deciding what a plea-bargaining defendant may
fairly expect.
a.

State and Federal Prosecutorial Promises

Federal courts have ruled that promises made by state's attorneys
generally do not impose binding obligations on prosecutors from
other states or on United States Attorneys. 14 In Staten v. Neal,1 5
the petitioner, Gary Staten, had escaped from a work-release program in Champaign County, Illinois, after his transfer there from a
prison in Fayette County, Illinois." 6 When Staten was later arrested
on robbery charges in Iowa, prosecutors there secured the Fayette
County state's attorney's waiver of escape charges as part of a plea
bargain with the petitioner in Iowa. a 7 After Staten had served his
Iowa sentence, the Champaign County state's attorney prosecuted
him on escape charges in Illinois." 8 Champaign County convicted
Staten, and the federal district court denied his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus." 9 The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that an Illinois statute placed strict limits on the actual authority of state prosecutors. 2 ' While noting that agency and contract principles guide
the disposition of Staten's due process claim, Judge Wood said that
the state's attorney did not have the power to make the promise that
he made. 2 ' The court found that Staten could not have fairly relied
upon that promise in pleading guilty to charges in Iowa because
such reliance would be contrary to clear statutory expression.' 22 The
court also rejected Staten's inherent agency argument, stating that
inherent agency extends only to actions which would normally be
114. See, e.g., Staten v. Neal, 880 F.2d 962, 966 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding that a state's attorney's actual authority extends as a statutory matter only to the county in which he was appointed,
and not to the entire state, surrounding states, or the federal government).
115. 880 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1989).
116. Id. at 962.
117. Id. at 963.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 962.
120. Id. at 966; see 55 I LCS 5/3-9005 (1993) ("The duty of each State's attorney shall be: (I)
To commence and prosecute all actions, suits, indictments and prosecutions, civil and criminal, in
the circuit court for his county, in which the people of the State or county may be concerned.").
121. Staten, 880 F.2d at 966.
122. Id. at 965-66.
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part of the agent's activities.123 Finally, the court rejected Staten's
apparent agency argument, finding that Illinois had never represented that the state's attorney had the power to act as an agent for
making promises outside his own county.124 In affirming the decision, the Seventh Circuit found that the Supreme Court's rule in
Santobello - that a prosecutor's promise which induces a guilty
plea must be fulfilled 12 5 - had not been violated. 26 Thus, where a
state statute clearly limits the scope of a state prosecutor's authority, a defendant's reliance on a promise which is contrary to that
authority will not be considered reasonable. 127 Further, that reliance
will not rise to the level of inducement required by Santobello.
b.

Promises by Other Federal Departments

When courts address the issue of whether promises made by other
departments of the federal government are binding on U.S. Attorneys and the Justice Department, the results are quite inconsistent.
In United States v. Rodman, 28 the First Circuit dismissed the defendant's indictment and held that a promise made by the SEC that
it would recommend that the defendant not be indicted in exchange
for making incriminating statements was binding on the government. 29 The court based its decision on fairness concerns and Rodman's reliance on the promise.' In Dresser v. United States,13 ' the
123. Id. at 966. In assessing the state's attorney's inherent authority, the court pointed out the
somewhat circular logic making it impossible for one to have inherent authority unless he had
actual authority, since making unauthorized bargains was not a normal part of the agent's activities. Id.
124. Id.
125. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); see supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text (discussing the due process concerns behind the Court's rule in Santobello); see also
United States v. Long, 511 F.2d 878 (7th Cir. 1975) (applying "hornbook law" to hold that no
agency existed to bind a U.S. Attorney to a promise of immunity from prosecution issued by an
agent of the Illinois Bureau of Investigation). "The government is not bound by acts of persons
who never have been, or in fact have ceased to be, its agents." Id. at 881 (quoting Newman v.
United States, 28 F.2d 681, 682 (9th Cir. 1928)).
126. Staten, 880 F.2d at 966-67.
127. Id.
128. 519 F.2d 1058 (Ist Cir. 1975).
129. Id. at 1059-60.
130. Id. at 1059; see United States v. Barrett, 390 F. Supp. 1022 (D.S.C. 1975) (ruling that a
government agent other than a prosecutor may, under the proper circumstances, bind the entire
government to the terms of his plea-inducing promise). In Barrett, a Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") agent allegedly promised the defendant special consideration and assistance in
exchange for his pre-indictment cooperation with the DEA. However, when that agent was relieved from the investigation after the defendant had cooperated, no "special consideration" was
given. Id. at 1024. The court would have been willing to bind the government to the DEA agent's
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Fifth Circuit came to an opposite result with respect to the SEC,
though under very different circumstances. Unlike Rodman, the corporation in Dresser did not face charges and had not yet incriminated itself when it sued the SEC and the Justice Department to
forestall its own disclosure of documents.1 3 2 The court held that a
contract between Dresser and the SEC, under which the SEC could
not release the results of Dresser's in-house investigation, did not
prevent the Justice Department from issuing subpoenas for those
records.'33 The court's decision was based on its ruling that the SEC
was not an agent of the Justice Department and thus had no actual
authority to bind the government.' The court did not consider the
alleged plea agreement promise had the defendant met his burden in proving its existence and his
reliance on it. Id. at 1024-25. However, the defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the agent had made the promise. Id. at 1026. The Barrett court stated: "There can
be no distinction between promises made by prosecutors in the Attorney General's office and
promises made by agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration. . . .[T]he government must
abide by the terms of a promise made to a defendant." Id. at 1024; see supra note 82 and accompanying text (noting the requirements for proving reliance in the plea bargain context); see also
United States v. Lieber, 473 F. Supp. 884, 892 n.17 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (explaining that, as a
matter of policy as of 1979, the Tax Division of the Justice Department abided by unauthorized
plea agreements affecting its prosecutions reached by United States Attorneys). Cf.In re Doe, 410
F. Supp. 1163, 1166 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (holding that "the government may not rely upon distinctions between express, implied, and apparent authority among its agents in avoiding the effect of
its promise" and that "[tlhese distinctions have meaning for the legal technician, not for the
layman dealing with the 'government' in his negotiations"). In Doe, the defendant had turned
cocaine over to FBI agents in exchange for their promise that he would not be subject to questioning by the government. Id. at 1165. In order to question Doe before a grand jury, however, the
U.S. Attorney sought to substitute the original promise with a grant of immunity from prosecution. To prevent his having to testify, Doe moved to vacate the immunity order. Id. The district
court granted Doe's motion, upheld the FBI's promise on due process grounds, and rejected the
prosecutor's argument that the FBI agent had no authority under agency law to bind the U.S.
Attorney's Office. Id. at 1165-66. The court noted that the promise in Doe was so closely analogous to a plea bargain that the principles of Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), controlled. Id.; see supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text (discussing the decision in Santobello).
But see United States v. Lombardozzi, 467 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that the promise of
an FBI agent did not bind the Justice Department where the court determined that the defendant
understood that the agent was not authorized to bind the Justice Department before the defendant
entered his plea).
131. 596 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1979).
132. Id. at 1233.
133. Id. at 1234-35.
134. Id. at 1236-37. The court said:
It is well established that the federal government will not be bound by a contract or
agreement entered into by one of its agents unless such agent is acting within the
limits of his actual authority. ...
If the rule were otherwise, a minor government functionary hidden in the recesses
of an obscure department would have the power to prevent the prosecution of a most
heinous criminal simply by promising immunity in return for the performance of some
act which might benefit his department.
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fairness concerns enunciated in Santobello'35 - concerns like those
which had governed the Rodman case with respect to plea agreements - controlling in Dresser, because no charges had yet been
filed against Dresser and because Dresser had not relied on a promise with respect to any prosecution. In other words, when courts are
dealing with promises made by federal governmental agencies regarding a plea bargain, or a situation sufficiently analogous to a plea
bargain, due process concerns will be given more weight than technical aspects of agency law.
c.

Promises Made by United States Attorneys

In perhaps the most confused area of binding plea agreements,
some courts appear to agree that a plea agreement made by a
United States Attorney in one judicial district can bind federal prosecutors in other judicial districts. The greatest confusion among the
courts in this area centers on differing definitions of the circumstances under which a United States Attorney may bind the entire
government to his promise. More specifically, the circuits vary
widely in defining what words, if any, a prosecutor is required to use
in order to bind other prosecutors to his promise.
In Giglio v. United States, l"' the United States Supreme Court
said that "[t]he prosecutor's office is an entity and as such it is the
spokesman for the Government. A promise made by one attorney
must be attributed, for these purposes, to the Government."' 37 This
passage seems to be a clear and definitive statement on the agency
status of U.S. Attorneys with respect to the Attorney General's office, the government, and each other. Nevertheless, some circuit
courts maintain a contrary view of a prosecutor's agency.' 3 8 Furthermore, even those circuits which espouse this same analysis
rarely cite Giglio as 9precedent in binding one prosecutor to the
3
promises of another.'
id.
135. 404 U.S. 257 (1971); see supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's concerns with fairness).
136. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
137. Id. at 154.
138. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 936 F.2d 221, 225-26 (6th Cir. 1991) ("[Elven if the
Turners were promised that they would not ever be prosecuted by the government, it is unclear
that a United States Attorney in one judicial district has the power to bind another United States
Attorney in another judicial district.").
139. See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 302-03 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing United
States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972)).
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In Giglio, after the petitioner had been convicted and was awaiting appeal, the district court discovered that an Assistant U.S. Attorney had made a previously undisclosed promise of immunity to
one of the witnesses who testified for the government at the petitioner's original trial.140 On appeal of the trial court's denial of the
defendant's motion for a new trial, the Supreme Court ruled that
the suppression of that material evidence justified a new trial "irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 4 " The
district court had proceeded on the theory that any promise made
by the assistant U.S. Attorney had been unauthorized, and thus carried little weight." 2 However, Chief Justice Burger stated that,
"[i]n the circumstances shown by [the] record, neither [the assistant
U.S. Attorney's] authority nor his failure to inform his superiors or
his associates [was] controlling. Moreover, . . . the nondisclosure
. . . [was] the responsibility of the prosecutor."'' 43 Though the

Court's words that "the prosecutor's office is an entity" seem clear
in the context of the Giglio case, they are ambiguous enough that
the circuits consider the issue unsettled in other contexts.1 44 In what
the appellate courts clearly consider to be the absence of a statement on this agency issue by the Supreme Court, the circuits have
been left to decide this fundamental issue on their own.
The clearest statement on the agency issue to come from the circuits, and one consistent with the reasoning in Giglio, appears in
United States v. Carter. 45 In Carter, the defendant asserted that he
was immune from prosecution in the Eastern District of Virginia
based on a promise made in exchange for his cooperation in the
140. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 152.
141. Id. at 153.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 154.
144. Id. Little has been written on this agency aspect of Giglio, as most commentators focus on
the case for its evidentiary suppression implications. See, e.g., George E. Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking, 53 TEx. L. REV. 203, 290 n.241 (1975) (stating that a prosecutor
is constitutionally required to reveal evidence of contingent compensations paid to an undercover
investigator); Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L.
REV. 859, 920 n.306 (1979) (discussing the setting aside of a conviction if it was obtained by the
prosecutor's knowing use of perjured testimony); Peter Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory
Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REV. 567, 608 n.112
(1971) (discussing the suppression of material exculpatory evidence). But see Charles A. Pulaski,
Jr., Authorizing Wiretap Applications Under Title III: Another Dissent to Giordano and Chavez,
123 U. PA. L. REV. 750, 791 n.172 (1975) (interpreting Giglio as holding "that the government is
bound by the knowledge or promises of any of its representatives, even if unknown to his associates or superiors") (emphasis added).
145. 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972). This case was decided less than one month before Giglio.
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District of Columbia.14 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed, holding that the government should be held to the terms of
its promise, notwithstanding the fact that the Virginia district court
had not even known of the promise.147 The Fourth Circuit reaffirmed Carter with its decision in United States v. Harvey,"'8
explaining:
[T]hough the Government negotiates its plea agreements through the
agency of specific United States Attorneys - as necessarily it must - the
agreements reached are those of the Government. It is the Government at
large - not just specific United States Attorneys or United States "Districts" - that is bound by plea agreements negotiated by agents of
Government." 9

The Second Circuit has expressly declined to follow the Fourth
Circuit's reasoning in Carter and Harvey, instead holding that plea
agreements bind "only the office of the United States Attorney for
the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively appears that the agreement contemplates a broader" application.150
However, the Second Circuit view does not foreclose the possibility
that one prosecutor may bind another. Instead, it requires an ex146. Id. at 427.
147. Id. at 428. The court stated:
The United States government is the United States government throughout all of the
states and districts. If the United States government in the District of Columbia,
acting through one of its apparently authorized agents, promised that the sole prosecution against defendant would be the misdemeanor charge in that jurisdiction, and
defendant relied on the promise to his prejudice[,] . . . we will not permit the United
States government in the Eastern District of Virginia to breach the promise.
Id.
148. 791 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1986).
149. Id. at 302-03.
150. United States v. Annabi, 771 F.2d 670, 672 (2d Cir. 1985); see also United States v.
Abbamonte, 759 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Alessi, 544 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1976).
Abbamonte and Alessi require that the prosecutors in both the district in which the plea was
entered and in the district in which the agreement is sought to be bound must both have overtly
communicated their intent to be bound.
At least one district court within the Second Circuit has refused to bind other districts to plea
agreements, in part based on 28 U.S.C. § 519 (1988 & Supp. 1I1 1991), which sets out the
authority of the United States Attorney General to supervise and direct all United States Attorneys, including the power of approval for all dismissals of indictments. United States v. Boulier,
359 F. Supp. 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), afid sub horn. United States v. Nathan, 476 F.2d 456 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied sub norn. Brown v. United States, 414 U.S. 823 (1973). But see United States
v. Lieber, 473 F. Supp. 884 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (binding the Internal Revenue Service and the Tax
Division of the Justice Department to the unauthorized promise of a United States Attorney
where the defendants believed that the prosecutor had been given the authority to execute the plea
agreement, an analysis leaning heavily on reliance and inherent agency principles). It is interesting to note that the same judge authored both the Boulier and Lieber district court opinions.
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plicit and intentional act by one U.S. Attorney to bind another, and
does not make such binding subject to the expectations of
defendants.
2. The Language of Binding Plea Agreements:
Presumptions

Dueling

There are two main views concerning the interpretation of plea
bargain language and whether a plea bargain will bind prosecutors
outside the district in which the plea was entered. The circuits are
clearly split, and most either explicitly or implicitly follow one or
the other of these views. The Second Circuit's holding presumes that
plea bargains do not bind others absent an affirmative indication
that they are intended to do so. In contrast, the Fourth Circuit
presumes that plea bargains bind others absent a clear indication
that they do not.
a.

The Second Circuit's View

A precursor to the Second Circuit's rule for analyzing plea agreements appears in United States v. Boulier.'5 ' There, the promise of
the prosecutor for the Southern District of Florida to dismiss the
defendant's indictment was held not to bind the prosecutor for the
Eastern District of New York because no one in the United States
Attorney's office in New York knew about the promise. 52 Further,
no one in New York had authorized the Florida prosecutor to speak
for them. 153
5 the Second Circuit's
More recently, in United States v. Annabi,5'
statement that "a plea agreement whereby a federal prosecutor
agrees that 'the Government' will dismiss counts of an indictment
other than the ones to which guilty pleas are entered," would appear
to bar the United States from reprosecuting the dismissed charges
in any other judicial district, unless the agreement is expressly limited to the district in which the charges were brought. 155 The court,
however, explained that Second Circuit law "has developed to the
contrary. A plea agreement binds only the office of the United
States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

359 F. Supp. 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
Id. at 168.
Id. at 170.
771 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1985).
Id. at 672.
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affirmatively appears that the agreement contemplates a broader restriction."' 56 At least one Sixth Circuit panel, in United States v.
Robison,1 57 - the subject opinion of this Note - has followed the
Second Circuit's reasoning and its general rule which presumes plea
agreements are not binding on other federal jurisdictions.
b.

The Fourth Circuit's View

The Fourth Circuit's rule for interpreting plea agreements has its
origin in United States v. Carter.'5 8 There, the court enunciated a
presumption that plea agreements made by one United States Attorney bind the government as a whole, in every state and district,
and suggested that only clear words to the contrary could rebut that
presumption.' 5 9 A more recent Fourth Circuit case reaffirming the
rule in Carter is United States v. Harvey,16 0 in which a plea agreement found to be ambiguous did not overcome the presumption that
it was binding on the government. 6 '
The court held the plea agreement in Harvey, which provided
that the "Eastern District of Virginia further agrees not to prosecute [the defendant] for any other possible violations of criminal
law arising from the offenses set out in the indictment or the investigation giving rise to those charges" to be ambiguous in scope.'6 2
Under a maxim of contract interpretation, this ambiguity was con6 3
strued against the drafter of the plea bargain - the government.'
The court also found that although the prosecutor could have
worded the agreement unambiguously in order to bind only the
156. Id. The Annabi court held that a plea agreement mentioning specific counts to be dropped
in the Eastern District of New York did not bind the Southern District of New York as to similar
charges brought two years later, where the agreement did not specifically state that it extended to
other districts or similar charges. Id.
157. 924 F.2d 612, 613 (6th Cir. 1991) (ruling that a plea bargain in which the "Government
agree[d] . . . [t]hat the defendant [would] not be further prosecuted for any activities which
arose in the Western District of Louisiana" did not clearly contemplate binding other U.S.
Attorneys).
158. 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972).
159. Id. at 428.
160. 791 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1986).
161. Id. at 303.
162. Id. at 296 n.I. The court found the words "Eastern District of Virginia further agrees" to
be ambiguous where it referred to the unit making the agreement on the government's side. Id. at
301.
163. Id. at 303; see supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text (discussing the maxim of contract law that ambiguity is construed against the drafter, and its variations).
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Eastern District of Virginia, he chose not to do S0.164
The Eighth Circuit also appears to apply the Carter standard to
plea agreements. In United States v. Robinson," 5 the court of appeals held that a plea agreement was not binding on the Southern
District of Iowa as it was expressly limited to the Southern District
of Ohio.' 66 Likewise, the Sixth Circuit employed the Carter analysis
to overcome the presumption and hold plea bargains non-binding in
two cases. The plea agreement in United States v. Turner'67 was
limited by its plain words to the Southern District of Florida, and
therefore the court held that it did not affect a prosecution in Michigan.'6 8 In United States v. Ykema, 6 9 the court assumed that a plea
agreement providing that "[n]o additional charges will be issued
against the defendant in the Western District of Michigan" was sufficiently limited in geographic scope so as not to bind any other districts.1 70 This holding was consistent with the Fourth Circuit's gen-

eral rule, which presumes plea agreements bind prosecutors in all
federal jurisdictions absent express words to the contrary.
While it has not explicitly aligned itself with either the Second or
the Fourth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Ingram,' 7' also applied reasoning consistent with the Fourth Circuit's
approach. In that case, the defendant, George Ingram, was serving a
sentence for state drug violations in a Colorado prison when he was
transferred to a federal prison in Wisconsin in 1986 to serve part of
a 1985 federal sentence.' 72 In 1987, FBI agents and Wisconsin federal prison officials secretly recorded Ingram's telephone calls to
members of the "Miller [drug] Organization" in Colorado as part of
an investigation into the continued smuggling of drugs into the Wis164. Harvey, 791 F.2d at 301.
165. 774 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1985).
166. Id. at 268. The agreement provided: "Defendant . . . expressly understands that this
Agreement applies only to the Indictment filed in this particular case in the Southern District of
Ohio and that it does not relate or apply to any other Judicial District of the United States." Id.;
see United States v. Nevils, 897 F.2d 300 (8th Cir. 1990) (analyzing a plea agreement consistent
with Carter and holding, without quoting language from the plea bargain, that it only concerned
specific acts charged in the defendant's California indictment, and not any subsequent charges
brought in St. Louis).
167. 936 F.2d 221 (6th Cir. 1991).
168. Id. at 225.
169. 887 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1989).
170. Id. at 698-99 (explaining that the government's only promise was not to bring additional
charges in the Western District of Michigan).
171. 979 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1992).
172. Id. at 1180.

PLEA BARGAINS

1994]

consin prison.'7 3 Ingram was unaware of the Wisconsin recordings
and investigation when he was transferred back to the Colorado
state prison in May of 1987.174
After Ingram's release from prison in late 1987, a Colorado federal grand jury returned a fifteen count indictment against the
Miller Organization and Ingram for drug violations which allegedly
took place in Colorado after Ingram's transfer back there. 175 During
subsequent plea negotiations, the Assistant U.S. Attorney for Colorado told Ingram's lawyers that their client was under investigation
for possible criminal violations outside of Colorado. 176 The Colorado
prosecutor knew about the Wisconsin recordings, but also told Ingram's attorneys that he was "neither willing nor authorized to bind
any federal district other than the District of Colorado" to any plea
agreement. 77 The defendant's attorneys acknowledged the limited
scope of the prosecutor's promise. 178 Ingram then agreed to plead
guilty to one drug count in exchange for the U.S. Attorney's promise to dismiss the other counts against him, and his further promise
not to file any additional criminal charges in the District of Colorado for criminal activities known to the prosecutor to have arisen
17 9
in the District of Colorado.

In May of 1991, a Wisconsin grand jury indicted Ingram and
several others for alleged Wisconsin drug violations. 8 ' Ingram then
moved the Wisconsin court to dismiss that indictment as a violation
of his Colorado plea agreement.'' The Federal District Court for
the Western District of Wisconsin, rejecting a magistrate's recommendation in favor of the defendant, denied Ingram's motion,' 82 and
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
decision.183

In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit noted the "tension" between
the Fourth and Second Circuits regarding ambiguous plea agree173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id.at
Id.at
Id.
Id.at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at
Id.
Id.
Id. at

1180-81.
1181.
1182.

1183.

1187.
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ments. 8 4 However, the court declined to expressly adopt either the
Second or the Fourth Circuit's approach in holding that the plea
agreement at issue unambiguously bound only the District of Colorado.185 Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit's holding is consistent with
the Fourth Circuit's view, under which a prosecutor may overcome
the presumption that a plea agreement binds all federal districts
only with words clearly limiting the geographic scope of that
agreement.
As a result of this split in the circuits, two courts may interpret
the scope of a single plea agreement in diametrically opposed ways.
The subject opinion of this Note, which follows, is one such case.
United States v. Robison186 is an example of what can happen when
an alleged crime crosses federal jurisdictional lines and implicates
the circuits' dueling presumptions.
II.

SUBJECT OPINION:

United States v. Robison

In Robison, a panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals sat,
ostensibly, to decide whether a sentence imposed by the Federal
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan violated a plea
agreement entered in the Eastern District of North Carolina.' 87 The
court applied principles of contract interpretation and held that the
agreement had not been breached. 88 The court also implicitly presumed that, although a plea agreement entered into by one federal
prosecutor could bind prosecutors in other districts, such agreements
were not binding absent a clear expression of a contrary intent. 189
A.

Facts

The appellant, Jack Robison, had been part of a scheme to distribute some 300,000 pounds of marijuana - imported into Louisiana on a boat called the "Bull Dog" - throughout several states. 90
184. Id. at 1185.
185. Id. The court of appeals also stated that the government need not inform a criminal defendant about all known evidence regarding uncharged offenses in order that he may negotiate to
specifically preclude them through the plea agreement. Id. at 1186. Furthermore, the defendant's
attorneys acknowledged that neither they nor the defendant believed that the plea agreement foreclosed prosecution based on investigations known to be under way in other districts. Id.
186. 924 F.2d 612 (6th Cir. 1991).
187. Id. at 612.
188. Id. at 613.
189. Id. at 614.
190. Id. at 613. These states included North Carolina and Michigan. Id.
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In the process of arranging to have the marijuana transported by
truck to Detroit, Michigan, Robison also went from Detroit to Louisiana to haul one load of the drugs himself.'9 1 While hauling these
drugs, Robison passed through the state of North Carolina. '9 2 On
June 13, 1986, the Eastern District of North Carolina indicted Robison on charges of interstate travel in aid of racketeering. 19 3 Seven
days later, Robison was indicted by the Eastern District of Michigan on marijuana trafficking charges.' 94
In October of 1986, Robison entered into a plea bargain in North
Carolina and agreed to plead guilty to two counts of possession of
marijuana with the intent to distribute. In exchange for his plea, the
prosecutor promised that "[t]he Government agrees . . . that the
defendant will not be further prosecuted for any activities which
arose in the Western District of Louisiana. ' 1 9 5 In November of that
same year, Robison pleaded guilty in Michigan to charges nearly
identical to those which were the subject of his plea agreement in
North Carolina.196 The Michigan court sentenced Robis n to seven
years in prison, a sentence which was to run concurrent y with his
earlier North Carolina sentence of five years plus probation'and a
fine. 197 On June 15, 1989, almost two and one-half years after his
sentencing, Robison filed a pro se motion with the Eastern District
of Michigan seeking to vacate and set aside his sentence there, arguing that the North Carolina plea agreement had given him "blanket
immunity" from prosecution in the Eastern District of Michigan for
the "Bull Dog" activities. 9" The Michigan district court denied the
motion, and Robison appealed.1 99 The Sixth Circuit panel which
heard the appeal interpreted the North Carolina prosecutor's promise as never having been intended to bind the Michigan prosecutor.2 00 Based on this interpretation, the appeals court held that the
U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan did not breach
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 612-13.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 613.
196. Id. The defendant pleaded guilty to the charge of attempting to possess with intent to
distribute the same 300,000 pounds of marijuana brought in on the "Bull Dog," which was the
subject of the North Carolina charges. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 612.
200. Id. at 614.
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that promise by prosecuting Robison on further charges.2"1
B.

The Sixth Circuit Panel's Opinion

A panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of Robison's motion to vacate his sentence; no
concurring or dissenting opinions were filed.20 2 The court first generally reviewed the law regarding plea bargains, noting the Supreme
Court's view that the practice presumes that the accused and the
prosecutor exercised fairness in securing their agreement.20 3 The
court cited Staten v. Neal" 4 for the principle that "fairness means
that the courts will enforce promises made during the plea bargaining process that induce a criminal defendant to waive his constitutional rights and plead guilty. ' 2 5 The opinion further explained
that, once a defendant pleads guilty, the prosecutor must fulfill any
promises made in exchange. 206 The court then stated that a plea
agreement existed, that the appellant had fully performed by pleading guilty, and that the job for the court was to determine the content of the North Carolina prosecutor's promise and whether or not
that promise had been fulfilled.20 7
The court ruled that it was required to determine the content of
the agreement using "traditional principles of contract law" because
plea bargains are contractual in nature.20 ' In moving to interpret
the agreement itself, the court noted the issue specifically raised by
the appellant - whether a United States Attorney in one judicial
district may bind another in a plea agreement - but stated that the
issue need not be addressed.20 9 Instead, the court applied contract201. Id.
202. Id. at 612.
203. Id. at 613 (discussing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971)).
204. 880 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1989); see supra notes 115-27 and accompanying text (discussing
the Staten opinion).
205. Robison, 924 F.2d at 613 (quoting Staten, 880 F.2d at 963).
206. Id. (citing Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262).
207. Id. at 613-14.
208. Id. at 613. But see supra notes 98-113 and accompanying text (indicating that using contract law alone may not be appropriate where, as in the plea bargain setting, a waiver of constitutional rights is implicated).
209. Robison, 924 F.2d at 613. Before stating that it did not need to consider the issue of
whether plea bargains are binding, the court set forth the conflicting presumptions among the
circuits: the Fourth Circuit's rule presuming that plea agreements bind prosecutors in different
districts absent an express indication to the contrary, and the Second Circuit's presumption that
plea agreements do not bind other prosecutors unless that intent affirmatively appears from the
record. The panel's subsequent analysis showed signs that the court had adopted the Second Cir-
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law principles to decide whether the district court had correctly interpreted the North Carolina plea agreement. The court reviewed
this issue as a question of fact under a "clearly erroneous"
standard.210
The court's contract-based analysis of the plea agreement focused
on the intent of the parties to that agreement. The court stated that
"[p]lea agreements are contractual in nature. .

.

.There can be no

contract without a 'meeting of the minds.' Whether or not there was
a 'meeting of the minds' depends, of course, on what the parties to
' Examining retrospectively the acthe plea agreement intended."211
tions of both the appellant and the North Carolina prosecutor, the
court decided neither party had intended the plea agreement to bind
other prosecutors in general, or the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern
District of Michigan in particular. 2 12 For example, in its analysis of

the parties' intent, the court stated that the North Carolina plea
agreement failed to mention the Michigan charges, despite the fact
that Robison had been indicted in Michigan before entering his plea
in North Carolina.213 The court interpreted these facts as demonstrating a lack of intent to bind the Michigan prosecutor. 21 4 The

court next noted that the appellant had not mentioned his plea
agreement to the Michigan court when he entered his subsequent
guilty plea there, but had only done so two and one-half years
later.2 15 Again, the court considered this omission to be an indication that Robison did not intend the bargain to be binding outside
the Eastern District of North Carolina. 16
In examining the intent of the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of North Carolina, the Sixth Circuit's opinion pointed out that
the investigations in both states, which led to separate prosecutions,
were conducted separately.217 The court also found that the North
cuit reasoning, stating that "it was intended by neither the United States Attorney for the Eastern
District of North Carolina nor Robison that the North Carolina plea agreement have any effect
on the prosecution in the Eastern District of Michigan." Id. at 614.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 613-14 (quoting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 cmt. c (1979)).
212. Id. at 614.
213. Id.
214. Id. Judge R. Allan Edgar pointed out that the Michigan indictment made "specific reference to the events surrounding the 'Bull Dog' marijuana," but that this indictment was not mentioned in the words of the plea agreement. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. (citing United States v. DiNapoli, 817 F.2d 978, 979 (2d Cir. 1987), which held that a
denial of a motion to dismiss a subsequent indictment, which the defendant asserted violated a
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Carolina prosecutor had not indicated an intention to affect the
Michigan prosecution.21 Finally, the court indicated that since the
plea agreement made no mention of Robison's Michigan indictment,
the North Carolina prosecutor had never considered doing anything
which might have affected the U.S. Attorney from Michigan. 19
Seeing no affirmative indications that either of the parties to that
bargain intended to bind other districts to the North Carolina plea
agreement, the court held that the agreement contained no such
promise to bind. 2 Consequently, the court ruled that the Michigan
prosecutor was not bound to his North Carolina counterpart's bargain, and thus was not in breach of the plea agreement. 2
Absent from the court's contract-law interpretation of the content
of the plea agreement was any analysis of the actual language of the
agreement.2 2 Its review of Jack Robison's Fourth Circuit plea
agreement, based as it was on conduct which crossed federal jurisdictional lines, raises issues of both interpretation and fairness. This
Note next analyzes the Robison opinion in the context of these
issues.
III.

ANALYSIS

The Sixth Circuit's opinion in Robison may be interpreted both
narrowly and broadly. Read narrowly, with respect to plea agreements entered into by one federal prosecutor and sought to be made
binding on others, the decision proposes that courts should interpret
the scope and content of these plea agreements using a retrospective
contract-law intent analysis. 223 Broadly interpreted, the opinion
stands for the proposition that U.S. Attorneys in different districts
are not bound by one another's plea agreements unless the intent to
bind appears affirmatively on the record. 2 4 This Note argues that
prior plea agreement, was not appealable where the investigation leading to this indictment was
neither conducted nor authorized by those who conducted the investigation which led to the plea
agreement). Notwithstanding this Second Circuit rule, the court heard Robison's appeal.
218. Id.

219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. The Sixth Circuit panel affirmed the district court's finding that "the parties to the
North Carolina agreement never intended to limit prosecution in other districts." Id.
222. Id. at 612-14. As mentioned in the text accompanying supra note 195, the plea agreement
stated: "The Government agrees ... that [Robison] will not be further prosecuted for any activities which arose in the Western District of Louisiana." Id. at 613.
223. Id. at 613-14.
224. Id. at 614 (indicating a willingness to hold the plea agreement binding if that intent was
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the court's application of contract principles is defective under a

narrow interpretation and that the court's reasoning is faulty under
a broad interpretation.
A.

A Narrow Interpretation

1. The Sixth Circuit's Subjective Interpretation of the Plea
Agreement
In applying contract-law principles to interpret the content of the
plea bargain 225 in Robison, the Sixth Circuit panel considered only
the intent of the parties to that agreement, as determined through a
retrospective analysis of those parties' actions.226 Courts frequently
apply objective principles of contract interpretation to plea agree-

ments. 227 However, commentators and courts usually define objective principles as comprising a prospective analysis

parties' intent at the time the agreement was made

looking at the

-

rather than a

retrospective analysis that looks back on the agreement from some
future vantage point. 228 The Robison court's purely retrospective

analysis, therefore, runs contrary to the weight of authority. For a
affirmatively shown and stating that "[t]he circumstances of this case disclose that it was intended
by neither the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of North Carolina nor Robison that
the North Carolina plea agreement have any effect on the prosecution in the Eastern District of
Michigan").
225. See supra notes 50-86 and accompanying text (giving an overview of contract law analysis
of plea agreements).
226. See supra notes 211-21 and accompanying text (noting that the court looked to the intent
of the parties).
227. United States v. Krasn, 614 F.2d 1229, 1233 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that any dispute
over the terms of a plea agreement is to be resolved by objective contract-law standards); United
States v. Crusco, 536 F.2d 21, 24-25 (3d Cir. 1976) (ruling that, where the court should judge the
circumstances of the guilty plea by "objective standards," there was sufficient objective proof that
the defendant misunderstood the sentence he faced); Johnson v. Beto, 466 F.2d 478, 480 (5th Cir.
1972) ("Plea bargaining is an accepted folkway of our criminal jurisprudence .... [Thus, iut
must have explicit expression and . . . [must be] measured by objective, not subjective standards."); see also United States v. Voccola, 600 F. Supp. 1534, 1537 (D.R.I. 1985) (holding that
the inquiry as to whether a plea agreement has been violated or not "is one of objective fact, not
of subjective intent").
228. 4 WILLIsTON. supra note 60, § 607; see United States v. Crusco, 536 F.2d 21, 24 (3d Cir.
1976) (holding that, where the record showed that the circumstances as they existed at the time of
his guilty plea justified the defendant's misunderstanding as to sentencing, there was sufficient
proof to uphold the defendant's claim that the government breached its plea agreement); see also
Baker v. United States, 781 F.2d 85, 90 (6th Cir. 1986) (ruling that an unambiguous plea agreement may not be challenged by subsequent affidavits). But see United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d
294, 302 (4th Cir. 1986) (allowing evidence of the parties' acts subsequent to the entering of a
plea agreement to infer the defendant's intent or understanding with respect to the plea
agreement).
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situation analogous to that surrounding Robison's plea agreement,

consider a person who pays for an extended warranty on a car, issued by a dealer in the manufacturer's name. Although the warranty on its face fails to state any limitations, problems arise when
the car's engine blows up after its owner relocates to another state.
When presented with the warranty, a dealer halfway across the

country analogously responds by noting that the warranty does not
state that it covers engines blown in states other than that in which
it was issued. Not surprisingly, that dealer does not wish to be

forced to fix the car for free. An analogous ruling by that dealer's
manufacturer representative would be to state that, in retrospect,
the warranty was never intended to cover out-of-state repairs, even
though it does not explicitly say so. Such a decision would render
the buyer's warranty useless, and illustrates the inherent weaknesses

of a retrospective contract analysis.229
Besides shunning prospective analysis by considering the Michigan prosecutor's views on the plea agreement, the Robison court
failed to apply another hallmark of objective contract-law interpretation: that is, the search for a common meaning ascribed by the
parties to the words of the plea agreement. 30 In the plea bargain

context, most courts first attempt to divine the parties' intent from
the meaning a reasonable person would give to the words of the

agreement, not from an inquiry into the parties' subjective interpretation.2 3 1 In Robison, however, the Sixth Circuit did not even con-

sider the words of the appellant's plea agreement in its analysis.

32

It is reasonable that a person in Robison's position could have inter229. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text (explaining prospective versus retrospective
contract analysis).
230. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text (describing this modern view of objective
analysis, in contrast to the old "strict objectivism," under which the intent of the parties or the
meaning they ascribed was completely irrelevant to the legal meaning of their words).
231. See, e.g., United States v. Ykema, 887 F.2d 697, 699 (6th Cir. 1989) ("[W]e make no
decision as to what the appellant's or his attorney's actual expectations were, [so] the words in the
plea agreement before us must be interpreted as a reasonable person would interpret the written
words."); United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 1986) ("We need not believe that
[the defendant] and his counsel actually read this disputed plea agreement with this settled circuit
law [as to binding] in mind. It suffices that they were entitled so to read it and may reasonably
have done so."); United States v. Crusco, 536 F.2d 21, 24 (3d Cir. 1976) (finding that, according
to objective standards, the defendant was reasonably justified in his mistaken impression as to
statements by the judge and by the government); United States v. Voccola, 600 F. Supp. 1534,
1537 (D.R.I. 1985) (holding that in interpreting a plea agreement, "[t]he court's inquiry is one of
objective fact, not of subjective intent").
232. United States v. Robinson, 924 F.2d 612, 613-14 (6th Cir. 1991).
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preted the promise that "[t]he Government agrees . . . [t]hat the

defendant will not be further prosecuted for any activities which
' to mean that the United States governarose in . . .Louisiana" 233
ment, and all the attorneys it employs, was barred by its promise
from further prosecuting the defendant for his "Bull Dog" activities.
Moreover, in assessing the parties' actions after they entered the
agreement, the court further departed from accepted principles of
objective interpretation by seeking to ascertain the parties' subjective intent. 234 The court did not consider any alternate interpreta-

tions of those acts which may have been reasonable when considered
along with the North Carolina prosecutor's words. 35 For example,
the court interpreted the fact that the North Carolina plea agreement failed to mention the Michigan indictment as proof that the
U.S. Attorney in North Carolina did not intend to bind the Michigan prosecutor to his promise.236 Such an interpretation may well be
consistent with the Second Circuit's presumption cited by the
court.237 But the defect in the court's failure to consider any other
interpretation of these actions lies in the fact that the plea agreement was entered in a federal judicial district within the Fourth
Circuit which, as the Robison court well knew, follows an opposite
presumption.2"' If a U.S. Attorney in that circuit, who knows that
233. Id. at 613. A defendant facing subsequent prosecution in another state for virtually the
same acts might likely be very eager to enter an agreement which removes that imminent threat.
Likewise, it seems very reasonable that such a defendant would read "Government" to mean the
entire bureaucratic entity and all the departments it controls. Whatever their reasonable meaning,
however, it is difficult to see how this court could neglect to even consider the plain words of the
North Carolina prosecutor's promise within its review.
234. Id. at 613-14; see supra note 231 (citing authorities supporting an analysis based on a
reasonable, and not a subjective, intent as to the meaning of the agreement).
235. Robison, 924 F.2d at 613-14.
236. Id. at 614.
237. Id. at 613 (citing United States v. Annabi, 771 F.2d 670, 672 (2d Cir. 1985), which stated
the Second Circuit's rule that U.S. Attorneys are not bound by one another's plea agreements
unless the intent to bind "affirmatively appears" from the record); see supra notes 151-57 and
accompanying text (explaining the Second Circuit's approach).
238. Robison, 924 F.2d at 613 (citing United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972),
for the rule that U.S. Attorneys in different districts are presumed to be bound by one another's
plea agreements unless the agreement expressly provides otherwise). The court in Carter explained its reasoning, stating:
If we hypothesize a single defendant charged with the interstate transportation of a
stolen motor vehicle through several states, we would not question that the efficient
administration of justice would support the authority of the prosecutor in one of those
states to obtain an indictment and bargain for a guilty plea, agreeing that all offenses
in the other jurisdictions would be disposed of in the single case. . . . A contrary
result would constitute a strong deterrent to the willingness of defendants accused of
multistate crimes to cooperate in speedy disposition of their cases . . ..
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his promise is presumed to be binding (as would defendant's counsel
in that state), fails to use words to negate the presumption, a binding plea agreement is the probable result of a prospective inquiry
into the reasonable intent of the parties.2 39
In another example of faulty reasoning, the court stated that "the
investigation leading to the North Carolina indictment was unconnected to . . .the one resulting in the Michigan prosection." 40 Yet
only two sentences before, the opinion noted that both prosecutions
were based on the appellant's "Bull Dog" activities, 24 1 an obvious
connection. Besides the flaws in the Sixth Circuit's contract-law interpretation in its own right, the court's approach to Robison's plea
agreement also raises concerns about the effect of that analysis on
the government's promises to Jack Robison.
2.

The Court's Analysis as an End-Run

The First Circuit has ruled that, in interpreting plea agreements,
a court may not do what amounts to an "end-run" around the government's promises.242 In both United States v. Voccola243 and
United States v. Mata-Grullon,2 " the court went to great lengths to
avoid finding "end-runs" under facts that are, however, clearly distinguishable from Robison. In Voccola, the plea agreement stated
that the government would not make a recommendation concerning
what, if any, sentence should be imposed by the court. 245 The court
found no end-run where the prosecutor technically made no recommendations, but rather informed the court of the harm the defendCarter, 454 F.2d at 428; see supra notes 158-85 and accompanying text (explaining the applications of the Fourth Circuit's rule); see also infra notes 262-75, 282-85 and accompanying text
(discussing the relative merits of the Second and Fourth Circuit views in the due process context).
239. See United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding a plea agreement
binding on other districts where it contained no words to negate the presumption of binding, and
where the prosecutor could easily have included such words if the agreement had not been intended to bind).
240. Robison, 924 F.2d at 614.
241. Id.
242. United States v. Mata-Grullon, 887 F.2d 23, 24 (Ist Cir. 1989); United States v. Voccola,
600 F. Supp. 1534, 1537 (D.R.I. 1985); see supra note 66 and accompanying text (explaining that
an overly literal reading of plea bargain language may result in a promise which actually promises
nothing). In the context of the agreement in Robison. however, one could argue that an overly
broad reading of the plea bargain language would lead to a similar result: the court could say
that, where the agreement said one thing, it actually meant something else.
243. 600 F. Supp. 1534 (D.R.I. 1985).
244. 887 F.2d 23 (IstCir. 1989).
245. Voccola, 600 F. Supp. at 1535.
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ant's acts had caused.246 Similarly, in Mata-Grullon, the court
found that the government's comments regarding the seriousness of
the defendant's offense pertained to the court's determination of the
appropriate sentencing range, and did not technically violate a
promise to recommend the lowest sentence within that appropriate
range. "' Yet, even the excruciatingly literal reading of the plea
agreements in Voccola and Mata-Grullon would likely yield an opposite result on the facts in Robison. The "end-run" rule seems intended to prevent a strained interpretation of a promise from rendering that promise utterly without meaning.
In both Voccola and Mata-Grullon, the plea agreements - read
literally - did not specifically prohibit the government's act in
question; they did, however, prohibit other actions and thus were not
meaningless. In Robison, however, the agreement - read literally
- prohibited the "Government" from further prosecuting the defendant for activities arising "in the Western District of Louisiana,"
where the court admitted the defendant's "Bull Dog" activities
arose."4" Such a strained interpretation of the words "the government" does, in fact, render the government's promise to Robison
meaningless with respect to further charges based on activities arising in Louisiana. The court's finding of an intent contrary to the
literal words of the plea agreement smacks of an attempt to do an
end-run around the effect of the promise duly made by the North
Carolina prosecutor and accepted by the North Carolina district
judge.24 9 Equally as troubling as the effect of the Sixth Circuit's
strained interpretation, however, was the court's failure to consider
the potential ambiguity of the words its reading so stretched to
construe.
3.

The Omitted Contract Law Ambiguity Analysis

In admitting extrinsic evidence to show the intent of the parties to
the North Carolina plea agreement with respect to binding other
districts,2 50 the Sixth Circuit panel put the cart before the horse.
246. Id. at 1537-39.
247. Mata-Grullon, 887 F.2d at 24-25.
248. United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 613 (6th Cir. 1991).
249. See supra note 15 (detailing the plea bargaining procedures under FED. R. CRIM, P.
1(e)).
250. Robison, 924 F.2d at 613-14. Under the favored "liberal" view of contract interpretation,
a court may use extrinsic evidence to help interpret the agreement once the court has raised an
issue as to the agreement's ambiguity. FARNSWORTH. supra note 56, at 503-04 (citation omitted);
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The court in Robison never determined that the words of the plea
agreement were unclear, nor did it address a specific issue as to the
agreement's ambiguity; the court, in fact, never analyzed the language of the promise at all.251 Thus, under "traditional principles of
contract law," the North Carolina prosecutor's promise should have
252
been interpreted according to the plain meaning of the words.
Furthermore, if the court had found the North Carolina plea agreement to be ambiguous, under an accepted maxim of contract interpretation doctrine, the defendant would have been entitled to the
benefit of that ambiguity.2 53
The court did not inquire whether the term "the Government"
referred to the U.S. government as an entity, or whether it referred
only to the North Carolina U.S. Attorney's office that issued the
promise." ' Thus, the court was premature in even attempting to determine, by extrinsic evidence, the scope of that term. However, for
see also Baker v. United States, 781 F.2d 85, 90 (6th Cir. 1986) ("To allow defendant to attempt
to prove by affidavit that the agreement is otherwise than it appears, unambiguously, on a thorough record would violate established contract-law standards."). Under the older, disfavored "restrictive" view, the court could not have even admitted such extrinsic evidence until it had determined the agreement to be ambiguous or unclear as a matter of law. FARNSWORTH. supra note 56,
at 502 (citing I SAMUEL WILLISTON. CONTRACTS § 95 (3d ed. 1957)).
251. Robison, 924 F.2d at 613-14.
252. Id. at 613; see United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 296 n.l (4th Cir. 1986) (holding
ambiguous as a matter of law a plea agreement which provided that: "The Eastern District of
Virginia further agrees not to prosecute [the defendant] for any other possible violations of criminal law arising from the offenses set out in the indictment" and that "the Government will move
to dismiss"). The court in Harvey pointed out that, had the government wished to restrict the
scope of the agreement to the Eastern District of Virginia, it could have easily done so by wording
the agreement to state that "the Government further agrees that defendant will not be prosecuted
in the Eastern District of Virginia.
...
Id. at 301. The Sixth Circuit, in United States v.
Ykenma, similarly stated: "If this [different provision] is what appellant wished to have in his plea
agreement, this is what he should have bargained for." United States v. Ykema, 887 F.2d 697,
699 (6th Cir. 1989). In Robison, if the North Carolina prosecutor had intended to restrict the
geographic scope of his promise, he could easily have drafted the agreement to accomplish this
goal.
253. See United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1986) (construing the ambiguity
concerning the terms "government" and "Eastern District of Virginia" against the government,
and to the benefit of the defendant); United States v. Vergara, 791 F. Supp. 1095, 1099-1100
(N.D.W.Va. 1992) ("[T]he government must bear the disadvantage of ambiguity or omission.").
Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1979) ("In choosing among the reasonable
meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which
operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds.").
254. Compare United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 428 (4th Cir. 1972) ("The United States
government is the United States government throughout all of the states and districts.") with
United States v. Annabi, 771 F.2d 670, 672 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[A] plea agreement whereby a
federal prosecutor agrees that 'the Government' will dismiss counts of an indictment . . .might
be thought to bar the United States from reprosecuting the dismissed charges in any judicial
district. . . .However, the law [in the Second Circuit] has evolved to the contrary.").
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an issue it said it did not have to address, the panel in Robison
seemed to dedicate a great deal of its opinion to deciding whether
the plea agreement entered by the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern
District of North Carolina bound the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern
District of Michigan to its terms. 55
Notwithstanding the argument that the result the court achieved
may not have been completely undesirable given the specific facts in
Robison, the means employed to reach that result were seriously
flawed. And it is those flaws which bode ill for potential defendants
whose offenses span more than one federal jurisdiction. By applying
subjective and retrospective modes of analysis rather than accepted
objective doctrines and principles to the plea agreement before it,
the Sixth Circuit panel in Robison construed that agreement in a
way the parties probably never intended. Equally important, in view
of the accepted law in the North Carolina district in which the
agreement was originally reviewed and accepted by the federal judiciary, the Sixth Circuit's review rendered meaningless many of the
protections the accused could have reasonably expected the agreement to provide.
B.

A Broad Interpretation

Though the Sixth Circuit stated that it did not have to decide
whether a U.S. Attorney in one judicial district may bind another in
a plea agreement, the court clearly did decide this issue.25 By holding that neither the United States Attorney for the Eastern District
of North Carolina nor Robison intended that the North Carolina
plea agreement have any effect on the Michigan prosecution, the
court implied that one prosecutor can bind another under the proper
circumstances. 57 Further, by adopting the Second Circuit's rule, the
court determined that the circumstance for a binding plea agreement is the expressed intent of the prosecutor, which must affirmatively appear from the record.258 The opinion held that the requisite
intent to bind did not appear from the record in Robison,259 and the
255. Robison, 924 F.2d at 613-14.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 614.
258. Id. at 613 (citing United States v. Annabi, 771 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1985)).
259. Id. at 614. But see supra notes 225-55 (analyzing and criticizing the court's interpretation
of the intent of the parties to the plea agreement in question, and examining the standards of
interpretation a defendant is subject to in the Sixth Circuit before a plea agreement becomes
binding on that jurisdiction).
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court's implicit analysis employing this adopted rule was faulty
since its presumption was inconsistent with fundamental fairness
and due process concerns attendant to the plea bargaining
process.2 60
1.

The Sixth Circuit's Presumption

The court in Robison implicitly presumed that U.S. Attorneys are
not bound by one another's plea agreements unless such an agreement "affirmatively appears" from the record.261 In the Second Circuit, a prosecutor must explicitly mention the issue of binding for
courts to find that it affirmatively appears.262 The Sixth Circuit took
this same tack, apparently giving great weight to the fact that the
U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of North Carolina, who
wrote Robison's plea agreement, never discussed that agreement
with the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan. 68 The
fault in this reasoning, however, is that it is inconsistent with the
requirements of due process in the plea bargain context set forth in
the Supreme Court's opinions in Santobello2 "4 and, more particularly, Mabry.26 5
For a guilty plea or a plea agreement to meet Mabry's standards,
the defendant must enter it voluntarily and intelligently.2 6 For a
defendant's plea to be considered voluntary and intelligent, the defendant must be aware both of the direct consequences of his plea
260. See supra notes 24-31, 98-113 and accompanying text (discussing fairness and due process
concerns regarding plea bargains).
261. See supra notes 257-58 and accompanying text (noting that this presumption was imported from the Second Circuit); see, e.g., United States v. Annabi, 771 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1985)
(finding that a plea agreement under which the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New
York dismissed certain charges did not preclude prosecution in the Southern District of New York
on similar and possibly related charges, where the prosecutors never conferred about making the
plea bargain binding).
262. See United States v. Alessi, 544 F.2d H 39 (2d Cir. 1976) (refusing to bind a prosecutor
where the prosecuting attorney had not consulted other districts); United States v. Boulier, 359 F.
Supp. 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding a plea agreement not binding where the U.S. Attorney had
spoken to the prosecutor in another district but did not expressly tell the prosecutor that the plea
agreement could affect him), aff'd sub noma. United States v. Nathan, 476 F.2d 456 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied sub nora. Brown v. United States, 414 U.S. 823 (1973).
263. Robison, 924 F.2d at 614.
264. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
265. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984); see supra notes 32-49 and accompanying text
(discussing the decisions in Santobello and Mabry and the due process concerns inherent in plea
bargaining procedures).
266. Mabry, 467 U.S. at 508; see also supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (noting the
requirement that a defendant's plea must satisfy fairness concerns).
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and of the value of any promises the court, the prosecutor, or the

defendant's own lawyer made to him.267 Given this definition of a
voluntary plea, it is difficult to see how a U.S. Attorney's failure to
discuss the issue of binding with his prosecutorial counterparts
makes a defendant fully aware of the consequences of his plea.
What one prosecutor fails to discuss with another prosecutor con-

cerning the consequences of a plea agreement is, by the very act of
that omission, unknown to the defendant. Such an omission cannot
reasonably be considered to have informed, in any meaningful way,
the defendant's understanding of the direct consequences of that
prosecutor's commitment to him.268 Yet the Second and, apparently,
the Sixth Circuits both hold that complete omission of any mention
of binding raises a presumption against it. 269 Santobello held that
the essence of promises which induce a guilty plea must in some

way be made known. 27" To presume that a party to an agreement is
informed that it will not bind other districts because both the agreement and the prosecutor are silent on that issue is inconsistent with,
if not contrary to, Supreme Court precedent.
267. See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of a defendant's
knowledge of what promises have been made in exchange for the relinquishing of his constitutional rights).
268. In the circumstances of Robison, where the appellant was a party to a plea agreement
stating that "[tihe Government agrees ... [t]hat the [appellant] will not be further prosecuted,"
nothing said between the North Carolina and Michigan prosecutors could have been said to affect
Robison's understanding as to the consequences of pleading guilty under that agreement. United
States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 613-14 (6th Cir. 1991). More to the point, the court's presumption that plea agreements do not bind unless they are expressly made binding allows the government's silence on the binding issue to be sufficient to make the appellant fully aware as to this
issue.
269. See supra notes 150, 156 and accompanying text (noting the language the Second Circuit
Court used to articulate this principle). But cf. United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 298 (4th
Cir. 1986) (stating that although the prosecutor "never made any specific representation that she
was authorized to bind other districts than her own..., neither did she specifically caution that
she had no such authority," and holding the agreement binding where it was silent as to this
issue). "[Tihe Government . . . [has the] primary responsibility for insuring precision in the
agreement." Id. at 301; see also United States v. Vergara, 791 F. Supp. 1095, 1099-1100
(N.D.W.Va. 1992) (upholding the government's unwritten promise not to pursue drug charges
against the defendant in exchange for her cooperation, and ruling that "in the absence of an
agreement, 'clearly understood by all of the parties, carefully memorialized, and fully disclosed to
the Court,' the government must bear the disadvantage of ambiguity or omission") (citation
omitted).
270. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261-62 (1971); see supra note 27 and accompanying text (quoting the Santobello decision); see also supra note 15 (setting out FED. R. CRIM P.
I I (e)(2), which states in part that "the court shall ... require the disclosure of the agreement").
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Due Process Concerns

It is the nature of the defendant's understanding of the content of
a plea agreement which determines what performance he is due, not
that of the prosecutors nor even the defendant's counsel. 271 Thus, in
Robison, the court's concern with whether the prosecutors believed
the defendant's agreement was binding is irrelevant. Likewise, it is
irrelevant whether the court would have considered a promise to
bind the Michigan prosecutor to be an unfulfillable or illegal promise. 272 This is so because a defendant waives a number of important
constitutional rights and guarantees by pleading guilty, 273 and the
Supreme Court has held that this waiver is no longer voluntary if
the government fails to deliver on any promise it has made. 274 The
fact that these concerns are premised on fundamental fairness and
due process concerns, on giving the defendant what he is reasonably
due in the circumstances,275 suggests that the time for a strict and
literal interpretation of plea bargains is before they are accepted by
the court.
a.

Court Approval of the Plea Agreement

Before a defendant enters his guilty plea and waives his rights
pursuant to a plea agreement, a court must first accept that agreement. 276 At this point, the court has an opportunity to actively investigate and question the terms of the agreement. If the agreement
is ambiguous as to the issue of binding, or fails to mention it altogether, the judge has an opportunity, with the parties to the agreement standing before him, to clarify the matter.277 If the court
271. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (noting that when a prosecutor's promise
induces a defendant's guilty plea, the defendant should receive what he reasonably expected he
would receive).
272. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text (explaining that even unfulfillable or improper promises which induce a guilty plea must be performed).
273. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text (discussing a defendant's waiver of his constitutional rights).
274. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509 (1984) ("[W]hen the prosecution breaches its
promise with respect to an executed plea agreement . . . [the defendant's] conviction cannot
stand."); see also supra notes 30-31 (providing examples of this rule in practice).
275. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (noting the Court's holding that it is important
to ensure that the defendant receives what he reasonably expected in exchange for his waiver).
276. FED. R. CRIM P. I(e)(3)-(4) (specifying that a court may either accept or reject a plea
agreement).
277. See, e.g., United States v. Ingram, 979 F.2d 1179, 1182 n.3 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting the
district court's dialogue with the parties as to their understanding of the plea agreement and
noting that the inquiry took place at the hearing at which the defendant entered his guilty plea
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places its imprimatur on a defective agreement, a defendant who
has clearly performed his part of the bargain by pleading guilty
should not be disadvantaged by the court's abdication of its duty to
perform a meaningful review.
b.

Giving Meaning to Court Approval

Applying this analysis to the facts of United States v. Robison, it
is important to note that the North Carolina district court was not
required to accept this plea agreement. Presumably, that court had
a full opportunity to inquire into the nature of the bargain, and if
the court had any qualms about the potential breadth of the promise
by "the Government" that the defendant would not be further prosecuted for any activities which arose in the Western District of Louisiana, it could have asked that the bargain be made clearer, or simply have refused to accept it.27a At the very least, a defendant
should be entitled to rely on a reasonable interpretation of the words
of his agreement. 9 Since the plea bargaining process is premised
on fairness in securing an agreement between an accused and the
government,2 8 0 allowing the government an opportunity to modify
the effect of its promises by subjectively reinterpreting them in hindsight, and by implying presumptions based on the absence of key
terms, in essence gives the government a second bite at its own
21
apple. 8
3. A Better Approach
An approach to plea agreements which is far more cognizant of
the due process concerns which such agreements raise is that of the
Fourth Circuit.28 2 Courts in the Fourth Circuit apply a presumption
and the court approved the plea bargain).
278. United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 613 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that the plea was
accepted by the North Carolina district court and that Robison was sentenced accordingly).
279. See supra notes 56-69 and accompanying text (discussing traditional contract principles of
objective interpretation).
280. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971).
281. United States v. Lieber, 473 F. Supp. 884, 893-94 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (noting that where
the defendants had begun to perform under a cooperation/plea agreement, but where the government was not realizing as much benefit as it hoped, the fact that "the Government struck a bad
bargain should not weigh against the defendants" and that "[w]hile the terms may not have been
as advantageous to the Government as those obtained in other cases, as in other cases, an agreement was nonetheless reached").
282. See supra notes 158-85 and accompanying text (describing the Fourth Circuit's rule for
interpreting plea agreements and subsequent cases which have used or interpreted this rule).
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opposite that of the Second and Sixth Circuits: "United States Attorneys in different districts are bound by one another's plea agreements unless the agreement expressly provides otherwise."283 This

rule creates a presumption in favor of binding judicial districts to
each other's plea agreements.
By requiring a prosecutor seeking to restrict the geographic scope
of a plea agreement to expressly mention its intended scope in the
agreement itself, a defendant has notice of any such restrictions
before he responds to the offer . 28 This approach thus satisfies the

intelligence and voluntariness requirements for guilty pleas much
more effectively and consistently than the approach of the Sixth
Circuit Robison court and the Second Circuit, both of which equate
noncommunication with actual notice.
The presumption favoring binding is also very simple to comply
with: a few words clearly express the prosecutor's intent in this respect.2 85 In addition, the burden placed on the government to comply with this approach is far lighter than the burden placed on the
defendant under the Second Circuit's approach, under which the defendant must shoulder the burden of being held to have voluntarily
and intelligently agreed to restrictions which may not be mentioned
in the plea agreement.
IV.

IMPACT

After the Sixth Circuit's decision in United States v. Robison,28 6
a defendant who is open to multistate federal charges and who seeks
to plea bargain with the government must consider how courts will
interpret those bargains in each circuit his conduct touches. 287 For
283. United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 613 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v.
Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 428 (4th Cir. 1972)). Note here that the Sixth Circuit court had before it
both the Fourth Circuit's presumption and the Second Circuit's presumption. See supra note 209
(noting that the court set forth the conflicting presumptions). Yet the court did not explicitly
choose one over the other. Instead, the court implicitly applied the presumption of the Second
Circuit to the facts of the case. Robison, 924 F.2d at 613-14.
284. United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 1986); see United States v. Ingram,
979 F.2d 179, 1185 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that, based on the Colorado prosecutor's unambiguous limitation of the plea bargain's geographic scope, the defendant and his attorneys knew full
well the effect of the agreement).
285. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text (presenting the language of the binding
plea agreement in United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1986), and the changes the
court suggested could be made if the prosecutor intended that it not be binding).
286. 924 F.2d 612 (6th Cir. 1991).
287. The Robison court summarized two conflicting circuits' approaches vis-A-vis binding plea
agreements, then said it did not have to address that issue. Id. at 613. Ironically, the court devoted
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instance, before an accused bargains for a promise that the government will not further prosecute him for the conduct underlying his
charges, he must explore the geographic scope each court might
ascribe to that promise. 88 The defendant must determine how each
different court will define words like "government," '8 9 and he must
consider whether each court will review his plea bargain as of the
time it was made or will scrutinize it using hindsight. 90 Finally, the
defendant must endeavor to ascertain each circuit's definition of
"fairness. 291 Consequently, the deviation among the circuits' approaches to interpreting plea agreements greatly impairs the certainty which a defendant has reason to expect from his bargain, and
2 92
which is fundamental to the accepted system of plea bargaining.
A.

The Scope of a Bargain

The Robison decision clearly demonstrates the contrasting presumptions some circuits make regarding the geographic scope of
plea bargains. While courts in the Sixth and Second Circuits presume that plea agreements - absent express language to the contrary - affect prosecutors only in the district in which they were
made,293 courts in the Fourth and Eighth Circuits presume an
much of its opinion to implicitly applying one of those approaches in analyzing the plea agreement
at bar. Id. at 613-14; see also supra notes 208-10, 230-41, 256-60 and accompanying text (analyzing the court's reasoning in Robison).
288. See supra notes 151-86 and accompanying text (explaining the views of the conflicting
circuits and their contrasting presumptions regarding the scope of plea agreements).
289. This question implicates two areas of inquiry. The first concerns the contract law doctrines
courts commonly use to interpret the words of plea agreements. See supra notes 56-69 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' differing applications of objective contract analysis in the plea
bargain setting). The second area concerned is agency, and the varied ways courts apply the
agency concept to determine who can act in the name of the federal government. See supra notes
136-50 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' confused reaction to the "government as an
entity" statement by the Supreme Court in Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972)).
290. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text (explaining that objective doctrines of interpretation call for prospective analysis of plea bargain language, but that some courts apply a
retrospective approach).
291. The Supreme Court first voiced its concern with "fairness in securing agreement between
an accused and a prosecutor" in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971). Since then,
the Supreme Court and numerous lower courts have further defined the meaning of fairness in the
context of plea agreements. See supra notes 23-31, 98-113 and accompanying text (discussing
"fundamental fairness" and due process requirements).
292. See supra note 31 (pointing out that defendants are entitled to relief when the government
breaches a plea bargain, whether or not the breach was occasioned by bad faith).
293. See United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 613-14 (6th Cir. 1991) ("There is no indication . . . that the United States Attorney in the Eastern District of North Carolina had any
thought of doing anything which would affect the separate prosecution of another United States
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agreement binds U.S. Attorneys in all districts absent express limiting language.294 Thus, given the same agreement with no limiting
language, it is very possible that one court would hold all prosecutors bound by the terms of the bargain, but another court would
hold the promise binding only on the U.S. Attorney who made it. A
defendant whose conduct exposes him to charges in both of the
above jurisdictions would have to satisfy the requirements of both
presumptions in a plea bargain negotiated with the first U.S. Attorney he faced, or risk further prosecution for the same conduct. In
addition, the consequence of bargaining first within one of these circuits is not the same as that of bargaining first within the other
circuit.
As an example of this dilemma, assume that a plea agreement
exists in each of two circuits having potential jurisdiction over the
defendant's offense. Each agreement comprises the defendant's
guilty plea in exchange for a reduced sentence and the U.S. Attorney's promise that the government will not prosecute any further
charges based on the same conduct. 295 Now consider, for example,
that the defendant bargains first with a prosecutor in a district
within the Sixth Circuit, then faces the same charges in the Fourth
Circuit. If the plea agreement contains no language to broaden its
scope, the promise will have the same effect in the Fourth Circuit as
it had where it was made. The defendant would be treated just as he
reasonably expected to be treated under the bargain because his
plea would bar the further charges.
But compare the result if the defendant bargains first with a U.S.
Attorney in a Fourth Circuit district, then faces the same charges in
the Sixth Circuit. If, again, the agreement contains no language to
broaden its scope, the plea bargain will have no effect in the latter
Attorney .... ");United States v. Annabi, 771 F.2d 670, 672 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that a
"plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the
plea is entered unless it affirmatively appears that the agreement contemplates a broader
restriction").
294. See supra notes 158-70 and accompanying text (describing cases from the Fourth and
Eighth Circuits employing this approach). It is also fair to note that two cases from the Sixth
Circuit have at least appeared to apply the Fourth Circuit's reasoning. See supra notes 167-70
and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Turner, 936 F.2d 221 (6th Cir. 1991), and
United States v. Ykema, 887 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1989)). However, the court's application of the

Second Circuit rule in Robison indicates a lack of consistency.
295. This hypothetical plea agreement is quite similar to the agreement in Robison. See supra
note 195 and accompanying text (quoting the language of the plea agreement at issue in
Robison).
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district. The defendant will be forced to choose between a trial and
a possible sentence for the same conduct, or even a second guilty
plea for, presumably, a second reduced sentence.
This was essentially the defendant's situation in Robison, yet the
court held that Jack Robison neither intended, nor reasonably expected, that his initial plea bargain would affect his subsequent
prosecution.""6 Such a decision seems to defy reality and scorn the
concept of fundamental fairness for plea bargaining set forth in
Santobello.297 As a result of this decision, defendants charged with
multistate federal offenses must hold out for promises that are explicit in geographic scope in exchange for their guilty pleas or risk
unexpected prosecution in other federal districts.298 Courts should
not allow this degree of uncertainty to prevail, especially given the
fact that consistent application of the Fourth Circuit's approach2 99
is a simple and sufficient solution.
B.

Due Process and Fairness Concerns

Because a defendant's guilty plea serves to waive important constitutional rights, the plea bargaining process implicates due process
and fairness issues. 00 The Robison decision highlights the ways in
which the approach this and other courts take creates additional uncertainty and unfairness for defendants. Courts in the Sixth and
Second Circuits employ an approach to plea agreements which
seems patently unfair and borders on being deceitful.
After Robison, defendants seeking to have their plea agreements
made binding on prosecutors from other federal districts may be
296. United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 614 (6th Cir. 1991).
297. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261-62 (1971); see also supra notes 23-31 and
accompanying text (discussing the fairness concerns enunciated by the Court in the plea bargain
context).
298. The Fourth Circuit has suggested another possible result of the refusal by some courts to
hold plea agreements binding on prosecutors in other districts. The court's opinion in United
States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972), stated that a failure to hold plea agreements
binding would deter defendants accused of multistate crimes from cooperating in the "speedy
disposition of their cases." Id. at 428; see also supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text (discussing the Carter opinion).
299. The Supreme Court espoused a similar view in the context of agency, indicating that all
U.S. Attorneys have the power to bind the government as an entity to the terms of a plea bargain.
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). But see supra notes 136-50 and accompanying
text (discussing the decision in Giglio and the fact that some courts have found ways to minimize
or seemingly disregard this part of the Court's opinion).
300. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507 (1984); see also supra notes 98-113 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of a defendant's waiver in the plea bargain setting).
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subject to conditions never communicated to the accused. Before
one prosecutor's plea agreement can be made binding on another,
the U.S. Attorneys concerned must each intend that they be bound,
and they must affirmatively express this intent in the plea agreement. Furthermore, the courts in these districts will deem the absence of an expression of the prosecutor's intent to bind to be sufficient notice to defendants that their plea bargains will not bind
other prosecutors. The effect of this presumption surely runs afoul
of the Supreme Court's holding that, where a guilty plea based on a
plea bargain implicates a waiver of constitutional rights, the defendant must enter that bargain intelligently and voluntarily.30 ' It seems
axiomatic that a waiver based on a lack of information is not intelligently made, yet after Robison it is clear that many courts will find
that such a waiver was intelligently made.
However, under the rule which courts in the Fourth Circuit apply,
a lack of information regarding whether a plea agreement binds
other prosecutors raises a presumption which favors defendants. Absent a clear expression which notifies the defendant otherwise, these
courts will give a plea agreement its broadest possible binding effect.
Uncertainty would be minimized if all courts took this approach,
because a plea agreement of expressly limited range is much more
likely to have truly been made intelligently and voluntarily.
CONCLUSION

In United States v. Robison,a02 the Sixth Circuit attempted to determine whether the federal government had breached its plea
agreement with the defendant, whose offenses spanned a number of
jurisdictions. The court ultimately affirmed the lower court's ruling
that the government's promise, made in North Carolina and stating
that the defendant would not be further prosecuted in exchange for
his guilty plea, was not breached by the defendant's subsequent
prosecution on identical charges in Michigan. 03 In its inquiry, the
court undertook to both interpret the agreement according to contract principles traditionally applied to plea bargains, and to avoid
choosing between conflicting circuits' rules regarding inter-jurisdic301. See supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text (explaining the basis of both the Supreme
Court's and federal statute's requirement that defendants demonstrate that they entered a plea
agreement voluntarily and intelligently).
302. 924 F.2d 612 (6th Cir. 1991).
303. Id. at 613-14.
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tional binding."°4 This Note has endeavored to show that the court
failed in both undertakings.
First, the court retrospectively applied subjective means of interpretation rather than prospectively applying accepted objective contract principles. 305 Second, the court implicitly chose to invoke the
Second Circuit's rule for potentially binding plea bargains, a rule
which is of great disadvantage to defendants. 30 6 The Second Circuit
rule that the court applied presumes that plea agreements are enforceable only in the federal district in which they were made, absent words which expressly broaden their scope."0 7 This troubling
rule treats the absence of language as actual notice to defendants
that the scope of their bargains is limited. In contrast, the Fourth
Circuit rule, which the court ignored, presumes that plea agreements are binding on all federal districts absent express limiting language. 3 8 This rule does not rely on implied meanings but instead
gives a natural interpretation to the words of the plea agreement, an
interpretation more in keeping with defendants' reasonable expectations regarding the government's promises.309
Unfortunately, after Robison, both approaches exist side-by-side
in the federal circuit courts. Federal defendants are left subject to
the uncertainty of the Sixth and Second Circuits' presumption
against binding. Further, they are subject to the added uncertainty
of negotiating plea bargains which may have to face contradictory
tests imposed by different circuits. 310 This Note has argued that this
uncertain situation should not continue. Since the Fourth Circuit's
rule stands as an easily-implemented and fundamentally fair solution to this uncertainty,311 this Note has suggested that courts
should therefore apply the Fourth Circuit's rule and reject the pa304. Id.
305. See supra notes 225-55 and accompanying text (analyzing the Robison court's application
of contract-law principles).
306. See supra notes 256-85 and accompanying text (analyzing the Robison court's application
of the Second Circuit rule and contrasting this rule with the Fourth Circuit's approach).
307. See supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit's view regarding binding plea agreements).
308. See supra notes 158-86 and accompanying text (discussing the Fourth Circuit's view regarding binding plea agreements).
309. See supra notes 300-01 and accompanying text (analyzing the effects of the Fourth Circuit rule on defendants).
310. See supra notes 286-301 and accompanying text (discussing the uncertain position of defendants potentially subject to both circuits' views on binding plea agreements).
311. See supra notes 282-85 and accompanying text (suggesting the Fourth Circuit's rule is a
better approach to the issue of binding plea agreements).

962

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:909

tently unfair rule adopted by the Robison court and others within
the Sixth and Second Circuits.
James P. Arrigo

